War Crimes Prosecution Watch

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC)

Official Website of the Extraordinary Chambers
Official Website of the Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force
Official Website of the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT)

Judges meet to keep ball rolling on Cambodian genocide trials
International Herald Tribune/ The Associated Press
May 31, 2007

PHNOM PENH, Cambodia: Cambodian and foreign judges met Thursday to narrow their differences on holding a much-delayed U.N.-backed genocide tribunal for former leaders of the Khmer Rouge, a brutal regime blamed for the deaths of 1.7 million people.

The judges' task over the next two weeks will be to adopt procedural rules necessary for convening the trials for crimes against humanity and genocide, hopefully by early next year.

Many fear that unless agreement is reached quickly, the aging defendants could die before being brought to justice.

Tribunal spokesman Reach Sambath said the meeting "is a very important and historical chance to bring the tribunal forward."

With the likely defendants ailing and frail, and almost three decades having passed without their victims seeing justice done, the tribunal has no more time to lose, said Marcel Lemonde, a co-investigating judge.

"We know that some of the possible defendants are elderly people. They might die, so that's precisely the reason why we have to be very diligent and try and organize proceedings as soon as possible," Lemonde told The Associated Press.

Once the rules are adopted, the investigation phase should begin within weeks.

The radical polices of the communist Khmer Rouge caused the deaths of about 1.7 million people through hunger, disease, overwork and execution during their horrific 1975-79 rule.

The tribunal, officially known as Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, was created last year after seven years of contentious negotiations between the United Nations and Cambodia. The government of Prime Minister Hun Sen — a former Khmer Rouge soldier — constantly bullied the world body for control of the joint venture.

With a US$56.3 million (€42 million) budget limited to three years, trials had been expected to start this year. But Cambodian and foreign judges spent the last six months bickering about the rules. The setting of expensive legal fees for foreign lawyers wanting to take part in the tribunal was the latest obstacle, resolved only in April.

The tribunal is an unprecedented hybrid, with Cambodian judges holding the majority in decision-making matters but needing one supportive vote from a foreign counterpart to reach a super-majority to prevail.

It is operated under the Cambodian judicial system, often described by critics as weak, corrupt and susceptible to political manipulation.

Lemonde himself never worked at an international tribunal before but was a judge in France for 30 years. Cambodian law, which guides the proceedings, is based on the French model.

"The whole system is a very complicated one," he said, pointing out that every decision has to be made jointly. Even language is a huge headache, he said, because everything has to be translated into Cambodian, English and French.

The rules have "only been one tiny issue that has taken a lot of energy and time from everybody," said Theary Seng, executive director of Center for Social Development, a non-governmental Cambodian group that monitors the country's courts.

Their adoption, she cautioned, will remove "only one hurdle among countless potential hurdles" ahead.

She said the larger concern is that the quality and determination of the tribunal and its personnel, both Cambodian and foreign, have yet to be tested, and they will have to show both mettle and flexibility.

Cambodian officials will be thinking in the context of their future careers, taking into account the country's political pressures, which will remain long after their foreign counterparts have gone, she said.

The U.N.-appointed officials are also facing a heavy responsibility because "they have to balance their role as international judges and prosecutors with integrity and a known name already, and they have to balance that with their concerns and their suspicions that the process may not be up to a level that they feel comfortable with," she said.

"This court has been organized probably not in an ideal way," said Lemonde, "but this was the only one acceptable to everybody."

Judges Cautious on Cambodia Trial Talks
AFP/ Yahoo News
June 4, 2006

PHNOM PENH (AFP) - Judges at Cambodia's Khmer Rouge tribunal opened talks Monday to end a long-running dispute in what many see as a last-ditch bid to save the country's genocide trials.

The meeting is the fourth attempt since November to approve internal court regulations necessary to move ahead with prosecuting those responsible for one of the worst atrocities of the 20th century.

Despite a high degree of optimism, judges were warned not to expect easy negotiations.

"It is not yet time to be confident we will reach a satisfactory conclusion," said Silvia Cartwright, one of the international trial judges.

Previous attempts bogged down over disagreements on legal fees and other procedures, sparking allegations of political interference and throwing the trials into question.

But judges are hopeful that they will be able to strike a resolution by the end of talks on June 13.

"People feel rather optimistic," co-investigating judge Marcel Lemonde, one of the 19 jurists who will vote on the rules, said before the judges went into session.

"The general mood is that the judicial process is going to begin at last," he said.

The talks follow separate meetings by foreign and Cambodian jurists last week to shore up their respective positions going into Monday's full plenary session.

An agreement on rules would be a major step forward in a process that over the past decade has been repeatedly stalled by fighting between the Cambodian government and the United Nations, which is jointly sponsoring the tribunal.

The trials are the last chance for Cambodians to find justice for crimes committed by the Khmer Rouge more than 30 years ago.

Up to two million people died of starvation and overwork, or were executed, during the communist regime's 1975-79 rule.

The Khmer Rouge abolished religion, schools and currency, exiling millions onto vast collective farms with the aim of creating an agrarian utopia.

Rights groups and legal advocates have called for swift trials amid concern that ageing former regime leaders will die before being brought to justice.

So far only one possible defendant is in custody, while several live freely in Cambodia.

The only other person to have been arrested for crimes committed during the regime, military commander Ta Mok, died in prison last July. Khmer Rouge leader Pol Pot died in 1998.

The first trials of former Khmer Rouge leaders had initially been expected this year.

However, the delays mean trials are unlikely to start before early 2008, officials say.

Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Internal Rules must meet international standards
Amnesty International
June 4, 2007

Amnesty International today called on the judges of the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC), as they open their plenary session, to ensure that the draft Internal Rules meet the highest standards of international justice.

The Internal Rules, due to be considered and adopted at this session, govern many important aspects of how the ECCC will work in practice. They must ensure that the ECCC trials are conducted fairly and that they fully implement the rights of victims. Although the Internal Rules are based on procedures in Cambodian law, there is a requirement that they are consistent with international standards.

This is the first time that the judges will meet in plenary to consider the Internal Rules since they were unable to reach agreement on a first official draft in November 2006. Amnesty International reviewed that draft and noted significant flaws, in particular:

* The draft Internal Rules failed to establish an effective mechanism to provide protection and support to victims and witnesses.
* Although the draft Internal Rules provided for reparations for victims, the scope and forms of reparations are vaguely defined and, in some instances, inconsistent with international law and standards).
* The draft Rules fail to incorporate rules necessary to ensure the protection and support of survivors of sexual violence.
* International rules prohibiting trials in absentia were not fully incorporated into the Rules.

To assist the Court in addressing some of these flaws, the organization submitted recommendations to the ECCC to effectively address victims and witnesses issues in the Internal Rules.

Since the November plenary, a committee within the ECCC has worked on the draft Internal Rules and has prepared a revised version which will now be considered by the judges. Unfortunately, the ECCC decided not to make the revised Internal Rules public, therefore it is not known to what extent the flaws in the previous version have been addressed.

Amnesty International urges the judges to ensure that the Internal Rules fully respect the right to a fair trial and the rights of victims. The organization believes that both aspects are fundamental to the credibility and the success of the ECCC. Anything less would seriously undermine the important and long overdue effort to ensure justice for the people of Cambodia.

Background
In June 2003, the United Nations and the government of Cambodia signed an agreement to establish the ECCC to bring "to trial senior leaders of Democratic Kampuchea and those who were most responsible for the crimes and serious violations of Cambodian penal law, international humanitarian law and custom, and international conventions recognized by Cambodia, that were committed during the period from 17 April 1975 to 6 January 1979."

On November 2006, the ECCC published a draft of the Internal Rules and invited submissions from civil society. The Internal Rules define their purpose to "consolidate applicable Cambodian procedure for proceedings before the ECCC and, pursuant to Articles 20, 23, and 33 of the ECCC Law and Article 12.1 of the Agreement, to adopt additional rules where these existing procedures do not deal with a particular matter, or if there is uncertainty regarding their interpretation or application, or if there is a question regarding their consistency with international standards."

The judges met to consider the Rules at the end of November but did not reach agreement on a number of issues.

In January, Amnesty International issued: Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia: Recommendations to address victims and witnesses issues in the Internal Rules effectively (AI Index: ASA 23/001/2007). The paper was submitted to the ECCC, including the committee considering the draft Internal Rules.

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Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC)

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents - Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

Is a Genocide Looming in Eastern Congo?
New Vision (Kampala)
By Emmy Alio
6 June 2007

A threatening situation is developing in the Kivu region in northeastern Democratic Republic of Congo, with ethnic tensions rising high and the Rwandan Hutu militia groups gaining ground.

The death toll in three villages in South Kivu province where sleeping villagers were last weekend clubbed or hacked to death by the Hutu extremists has risen to 29.

The United Nations Observer Mission in Congo (MONUC) investigators, trying to reach the affected villages, have been met by stone-throwing crowds. A faction of a Rwandan rebel group, the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), carried out the killings in retaliation over Congolese army operations against them. The faction, known as 'the Rastas', vowed to return to punish civilians.

This incident is a picturesque reminder of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda where the extremist Hutu, known as the Interahamwe and former fighters of Rwandan Armed Forces (Ex-FAR) clubbed, macheted and shot to death an estimated 800,000 Tutsis and moderates Hutus in 100 days.

In Congo, the extremists Rwandan Hutus, operating under the umbrella of FDLR, have continued to kill indigenous Congolese civilians, but threats to flush them out have not materialised. Yet FDLR has continued to grow in strength and experience. Conservative estimates by the International Crisis Group has estimated their strength at 8,000 to 10,000. Their dream is to return to Rwanda.

MONUC website has pointed to Walungu, Kanyola, Kyalubeze, Chikamba territory in south Kivu province as being controlled by the Rwandan Hutu extremists.

In North Kivu province, the Hutu extremists are equally active and control villages in Rutshuru territory. They use bases inside Virunga and Maiko national parks to raid neighbouring villages. In these camps, women are trained as soldiers, and children are born and brought up as soldiers.

Ishasha and Nyamirima, along the Uganda borderline, are operation zones for these militias, who are closely associated with the Mai Mai group of Vasaka Sikuli Kakule alias La Fontaine.

New threats

There were renewed calls for peace in north Kivu province when the largest rebel group, led by Gen. Laurent Nkunda, signed a ceasefire agreement in Kigali last December.

The accord imposed a militay strategy whereby Nkunda and the Congolese army-FARDC agreed to merge their forces with a particular objective of fighting the Hutu extremists.

The mixed brigades, locally referred to as mixage, registered several victories against FDLR and drove them deeper into the jungles and national parks.

This wind of change was reversed by the sudden support FDLR received from leaders of the main ethnic groups: the Wanande, the Watembo, Wahunde and Wanyange.

A new anti-Tutsi alliance, PAROCO-FAP was born on March 15. The composition of its commanders showed the ethnic composition of the ethnic tribes of north Kivu. But also, it included a Rwandan Hutu only known as as Col. Mugabo.

The original document of PARECO-FAP gave the command structure as Col. Sikuli Kakule (Munande), Col. Ntasibaganga (a Muhunde), Col. Blaise (a Munyange) and Col. Kirikicho (a Tembo.

One of the objectives of PARECO-FAP is that the local population will support the Hutus. The alliance also want the Rwandan Hutu problem to be resolved through dialogue with the Kigali government. The group asked the population to reject the mixed brigade of Nkunda's forces and the Congolese army. Surprisingly, the support for the group was big and its activities forced Nkunda to threaten to withdraw from the mixage arrangement.

The increased fighting and tension led to a refugee influx into Uganda IDPs. The inflamed situation also forced a seven-man ministerial delegation, led by interior minister Denis Kalume Numbi, to reconcile the north Kivu tribes and discuss the question of mixage.

The ministers are yet to release their report. But anger is brewing in Kigali and on the ranks of Nkunda's soldiers.

The Kigali fury led to the Kinshasa government requesting for a meeting to discuss the issue of the Hutu extremists.

The New Times of Rwanda recently confirmed that the Congolese authorities wrote to the Rwanda government requesting for a meeting between the two in a bid to find a lasting solution to the activities of FDLR rebels.

Quoting the Rwandan State Minister for Regional Cooperation, Rosemary Museminari, The New Tmes confirmed that the meeting with DRC officials will be in Lubumbashi on May 5 to May 7.

The talks will be held in the margin of Tripartie -plus meetings, which brings together Rwanda, DRC, Uganda and Burundi.

The hate campaign preached by PARECOF-TAP and major ethnic groups in north Kivu province is similar to the situation that led to the one in Rwanda before 1994.

A more serious regional mechanism is required to stop a potential new genocide in the Great Lakes region.

UN human rights chief 'appalled' by sexual violence in DR Congo, Burundi
UN News
June 1, 2007

The top United Nations human rights official today said that she was appalled by the level of sexual and gender-based violence she found in Africa's Great Lakes region, particularly in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Burundi.

"I have to say the level of sexual violence and its intensity is pretty surprising and appalling," High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise Arbour told reporters in New York after briefing the Security Council on her recent 12-day visit to the region, where she toured the DRC, Rwanda and Burundi.

"Gender-based violence is not just an affront to dignity; it is a form of torture and absolute brutal physical and mental assault on the victims," she said.

In a hospital Ms. Arbour visited in Kisangani in the northern DRC, one of the many she stopped at during her mission, she said that 60 per cent of the cases involved victims between the ages of 11 and 17.

Providing medical assistance – such as major fistula surgery – to assist victims is key, Ms. Arbour said, but she observed that "what is required is so out of reach," both in terms of resources and of manpower.

She stressed that efforts targeting perpetrators and bring them to justice are also crucial.

While women who have been victims of violence have been ostracized and stigmatized, those behind the crimes operate with impunity, she said. In some instances, women are teased by the very same people who attacked them.

Deficits in the justice systems in the DRC and Burundi must be addressed to ensure that perpetrators of such crimes are prosecuted, she said. The system in the DRC is "so deficient," she said, with informal settlements often taking place so those responsible are not charged. Meanwhile in Burundi, she said that magistrates themselves have commented on the corruption and interference thwarting the prosecution of cases.

In the DRC, the High Commissioner said that she travelled to such areas as Kisangani as well as Bunia and Goma in the east, "where armed groups are still continuing their predatory practices."

One of the unfortunate effects in the DRC of the reintegration of militia leaders into the Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) is that "they have been emboldened, further empowered and seem to be continuing exactly the same pattern of predatory practices against civilians in the region," she noted, calling for a major reform of the security sector.

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Darfur, Sudan (ICC)

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents - Situation in Darfur, Sudan

Amnesty International Adopts Powerful Technology in Camapign to Protect Civilians in Darfur -- Satellite Cameras to Monitor Events on the Ground
Amnesty International
June 6, 2007

(New York) - Amnesty International is using satellite cameras to monitor highly vulnerable villages in war-torn Darfur, Sudan. The human rights organization is inviting ordinary people worldwide to monitor 12 villages by visiting the Eyes on Darfur project website (www.eyesondarfur.org) and put the Sudanese Government on notice that these and other areas in the region are being watched around the clock.

"Despite four years of outrage over the death and destruction in Darfur, the Sudanese government has refused worldwide demands and a U.N. resolution to send peacekeepers to the region," said Irene Khan, Secretary General of Amnesty International. "Darfur needs peacekeepers to stop the human rights violations. In the meantime, we are taking advantage of satellite technology to tell President al-Bashir that we will be watching closely to expose new violations. Our goal is to continue to put pressure on Sudan to allow the peacekeepers to deploy and to make a difference in the lives of vulnerable civilians on the ground in Darfur."

Ariela Blätter, director of the Crisis Prevention and Response Center for Amnesty International USA (AIUSA), who led development of Eyes on Darfur, will describe the project and its capabilities at the Fifth International Symposium on Digital Earth at the University of California at Berkeley on Wednesday, June 6. Blätter will give a presentation from 2-3:30 pm Pacific time.

According to Blätter, new images of the same villages are being added currently within days of each other. This time frame offers the potential for spotting new destruction. Amnesty International worked with noted researchers to identify vulnerable areas based on proximity to important resources like water supplies, threats by militias or nearby attacks.

Amnesty International worked closely on the project with the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), which offered expertise on satellite imagery and other cutting edge geospatial technologies. The images from commercial satellites can reveal visual information about conditions on the ground for objects as small as two feet across. According to Lars Bromley, project director for the AAAS Science and Human Rights Project who advised Blätter on technical matters, the photos could show destroyed huts, massing soldiers or fleeing refugees.

Amnesty International has been at the forefront of efforts to wed human rights work with satellite technology. For example, Amnesty, the AAAS and the Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights joined in a ground-breaking project in 2006 to document the destruction of a settlement by the Zimbabwean government. The groups presented evidence that the government destroyed entire settlements, including the informal settlement of Porta Farm, forcing thousands of civilians to flee.

Eyes on Darfur also includes an archival feature, which shows destroyed villages since the conflict began in 2003 and includes expert testimony. For example, an image of the village of Donkey Dereis in south Darfur taken in 2004 shows an intact landscape with hundreds of huts. Two years later, a satellite image shows the near total destruction of the villages -- 1,171 homes gone and the landscape overgrown with vegetation.

Eyes on Darfur adds a new component to Amnesty International's global campaign to stop the human rights violations in Darfur. In 2003 and 2004, Amnesty International supplied some of the earliest documentation ? eyewitness testimony from the ground ? that warned of the impending humanitarian and human rights catastrophe. A critical mission in 2004 focused world attention and galvanized opinion about the brutal conditions in the country. Amnesty International's exposure of horrific violence -- the torching of villages and the campaign of sexual violence against women and girls -- built awareness worldwide of the brutality.

This month, AIUSA launches the CD "Instant Karma: The Amnesty International Campaign to Save Darfur," a collection of iconic John Lennon songs recorded by best-selling artists to support its efforts on Darfur and inspire a new generation of human rights activists through music. To learn more about the project, go to www.instantkarma.org

About Amnesty International (www.amnestyusa.org)

Amnesty International's 2.2 million members include people from all walks of life taking action to protect people wherever justice, freedom, truth and dignity are denied. Amnesty International, the world's largest human rights organization and winner of the 1977 Nobel Peace Prize, investigates and exposes abuses, educates and mobilizes the public and helps transform societies to create a safer, more just world.

UN war crimes prosecutor calls for arrest of first Darfur suspects
UN News Centre
7 June 2007

Briefing the Security Council today, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC) called for the arrest of the two suspects wanted to stand trial for war crimes and crimes against humanity in Sudan's conflict-wracked Darfur region.

Early last month, the ICC issued arrest warrants for Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Minister of State for the Interior of the Government of Sudan and currently Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, and Janjaweed militia leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd-Al-Rahman, also known as Ali Kushayb.

"Acting together, they committed crimes against humanity and war crimes," ICC Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo told the 15-member Council.

The ICC's investigation of the two men focuses primarily between 2003 and 2004 when the highest number of crimes were recorded.

Mr. Moreno-Ocampo underscored that the Council and regional organizations – such as the African Union (AU) and the Arab League – must lead the effort to encourage Sudan to arrest the two men and surrender them to the ICC.

"The territorial State, the Sudan, has the legal obligation and the ability" to arrest and surrender the suspects to the ICC, the Prosecutor said.

Although "a degree of cooperation has been forthcoming" from the Sudanese Government, to date, it has refused to allow for the questioning of Mr. Kushayb and Mr. Harun, he told the Council. He said that he hopes that the Council can bring the issue up when it visits Khartoum on 17 June as part of its weeklong mission to the region.

"Today, the Security Council recognized the need to emphasize and [remind] the Sudanese authorities about their responsibility," Mr. Moreno-Ocampo told reporters after the Council meeting.

A militia commander also known as the "colonel of colonels," Mr. Kushayb "personally led militia/Janjaweed during attacks" on four villages, "presiding over summary executions and massive rapes," Mr. Moreno-Ocampo told the Council.

Mr. Harun, who was appointed as Minister of State for the Interior and head of the "Darfur security desk" in 2003, "recruited militia/Janjaweed and incited them to violence with full knowledge that they, often in the course of joint attacks with the Sudanese Army, would commit crimes against the civilian population," Mr. Moreno-Ocampo said.

Given that Mr. Harun is currently his country's Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo told reporters that it is "unacceptable" that "these people who were his victims are in his hands."

In its 27 April decision, the ICC determined that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the two suspects are criminally responsible for 51 counts of crimes against humanity, including persecution, murder, rape and other forms of sexual violence, torture and cruel treatment.

"The key is their arrest and surrender," Mr. Moreno-Ocampo said to the Council, adding that his Office is finalizing its preparations for pre-trial proceedings against the two men.

The Prosecutor said that, in addition to the Darfur investigation which has been going on for two years, his Office is also looking into current crimes committed by all sides.

He said that the Sudanese Government has launched "indiscriminate and disproportionate" air strikes in Darfur from January through April. The ICC has also heard reports that women who are internally displaced have been raped when venturing outside their camps. It has also heard about local clashes which in part have been allegedly motivated to reward people collaborating with the Militia/Janjaweed.

Outside Sudan, Mr. Moreno-Ocampo said the ICC is also looking into the spillover effects in neighbouring Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR).

In eastern Chad, he said that his Office has compiled information on reported attacks on refugee camps and in the villages of Tiero and Marena in March. There have been reported incursions by militia/Janjaweed from Sudan, as well as the presence of Sudanese rebels in Chad and Chadian rebels in Sudan.

Meanwhile in CAR, the ICC opened an investigation last month into crimes – including massive rapes – allegedly committed between 2002 and 2003.

Mr. Moreno-Ocampo voiced alarm that aid workers have been assaulted and beaten and their vehicles have been hijacked, stressing that attacks on humanitarian personnel are "prohibited under international humanitarian law and constitute a war crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC."

He also expressed concern for attacks on UN peacekeepers in Sudan and AU troops. In the period from early February to early May of this year alone, 11 AU peacekeepers and police officers have been killed and five seriously wounded.

In a related development, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) announced that the situation in Darfur last month was characterized by forced civilian movement given increasing insecurity, rising tensions in camps, surging numbers of the displaced and increasing targeted violence against aid operations.

Almost 140,000 people have become internally displaced since the start of the year, with at least 10,000 newly displaced in May, according to UNMIS.

The Mission also called attention to the rising use of physical and mental violence against non-governmental organizations' compounds and staff.

The Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Darfur Jan Eliasson is arriving in New York today and is scheduled to brief the Security Council tomorrow on his joint efforts with the AU to revive the peace process, according to Ban Ki-moon's spokesperson.

The UN and AU are expected to meet with Sudanese authorities in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa on 11 and 12 June regarding the planned hybrid force, and the Security Council will hear a briefing on the meeting's outcome prior to its departure for Africa on 14 June.

UN: Press Khartoum to Arrest Darfur Suspects
Human Rights Watch
June 7, 2007

(New York, June 7, 2007) – The United Nations Security Council should reiterate Khartoum's binding legal obligation to execute arrest warrants issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), Human Rights Watch said today. This morning the ICC prosecutor is briefing the Security Council on the progress of his investigations in Darfur, the week before a council mission to Khartoum.

"Khartoum will further isolate itself on the world stage if it shelters suspects indicted for crimes against humanity in Darfur," said Richard Dicker, director of Human Rights Watch's International Justice Program. "If individual Security Council members enable Khartoum to thwart justice, they risk being tainted by Sudan's blatant lawlessness."

In March 2005, the Security Council referred the situation in Darfur to the ICC prosecutor and imposed an obligation on Sudan to cooperate fully with the court's investigations in resolution 1593. On May 2, 2007, the ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber issued warrants for arrest of Sudan's state minister for humanitarian affairs, Ahmed Haroun, and the Janjaweed militia leader known as Ali Kosheib for a series of attacks in West Darfur in 2003 and 2004. Ali Kosheib is reportedly in Sudanese custody on the basis of other charges being brought in national proceedings.

"The landscape changed with the arrest warrants for Haroun and Kosheib," said Dicker. "In failing to hand over war crimes suspects in its control, Khartoum is openly flouting both a Security Council resolution and an international court order."

Since early 2003, Sudanese government forces and government-backed militia known as Janjaweed have committed crimes against humanity and war crimes on a massive scale in the context of counterinsurgency operations against rebel movements in Darfur, a western Sudanese region bordering Chad.

More than 2 million of Darfur's estimated population of 6 million people have been forcibly displaced from their homes since February 2003 as a result of a government-supported campaign of "ethnic cleansing" carried out in an internal armed conflict. Since early 2004, Human Rights Watch has comprehensively documented the Sudanese government's responsibility for crimes against humanity and war crimes in Darfur.

"Our research indicates that Sudanese officials at the highest levels were responsible for widespread atrocities in Darfur in 2003 and 2004," said Dicker. "To ensure justice is done, the prosecutor must follow the evidence further up the chain of command."

In its December 2005 report, "Entrenching Impunity," Human Rights Watch described in detail the Sudanese government's strategy of using civilian officials and the armed forces to recruit, support, and coordinate the Janjaweed militias. The report also highlights the role of senior Sudanese government policymakers in initiating and implementing the campaign.

ICC Prosecutor Urges UN Security Council Action on Darfur
Pushes International Community to Help Ensure Arrest and Surrender of Suspects Coalition for the International Criminal Court
www.iccnow.org
June 7, 2007

New York, NY: On 7 June 2007, the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo addressed the United Nations Security Council on the Court's investigation in Darfur just one week prior to the Council's mission to Khartoum. The situation in Darfur was referred to the Court by the Council through Resolution 1593, which obligates the prosecutor to report to the Council every six months. This is the fifth report of the prosecutor to the UN Security Council.

In today's report, the prosecutor stressed three key points: the urgent need for regional and international cooperation in securing the arrest and surrender of the named suspects; the admissibility of the prosecutor's case despite Sudanese investigations of grave crimes; and the continuing crisis in the region that requires prompt action.

The prosecutor urged the Security Council to address concerns relating to the Court's investigation in Sudan during its mission to Khartoum next week. The Court does not have its own police force, and requires the cooperation of governments to ensure the arrest and surrender of named suspects.

In a statement to the media, Ambassador Johan C. Verbeke from Belgium, which is the current President of the Council, spoke in his national capacity: "The fight against impunity is part and parcel of the search for peace and stability in Sudan." Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, permanent representative of the United States to the UN, also made a statement to the media in which he said, "We call upon the Sudanese government to cooperate with the prosecutor."

Here are key highlights from the ICC prosecutor's report:

On Cooperation

"…In accordance with the Court's decision, the Registry is transmitting requests for cooperation to execute the warrants. The objective is now to ensure the appearance of these individuals in Court. This major challenge requires the unconditional cooperation of all. The Security Council and regional organizations must take the lead in calling on the Sudan as the territorial State to arrest the two individuals and ensure their appearance in Court….as soon as practicable, the [ICC] Registrar shall transmit two requests for cooperation seeking the arrest and surrender of Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb to the competent Sudanese authorities; to all Sudanese authorities; to all States Parties to the Statute; to all United Nations Security Council members that are not States Parties to the Statute; and to Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and Libya….A concerted, collective, coordinated effort on the part of the Government of the Sudan and the regional and international community remains essential to stop the commission of further crimes and reverse the prevailing sense of impunity in Darfur…"

On Admissibility

"…The Prosecution's case is concerned with Ahmad Harun and Ali Kushayb joining together as part of a systematic and organized initiative to attack civilian populations in Darfur. There is no investigation into such criminal conduct. The Sudanese investigations do not encompass the same persons and the same conduct which are the subject of the case before the Court. To the extent that the investigations do involve one of the individuals named in the application, they do not relate to the same conduct which is the subject of the case before the Court. National proceedings are not in respect of the same incidents and address a significantly narrower range of conduct. The Prosecution considers therefore that the case is admissible…"

On the Current Security Situation in the Region

"…the Office [of the Prosecutor] is continuing to gather information about current crimes committed by all the parties to the conflict in Darfur and is monitoring the spill-over of violence in Chad, including in refugee camps, and in the Central African Republic, which are both States Parties to the Rome Statute. In Darfur, the Office notes with concern allegations of indiscriminate and disproportionate air strikes by the Government of the Sudan….Allegations of crimes committed by rebel forces, including against international personnel, are also being reported and analysed….numerous aid workers have been assaulted and beaten, their vehicles hijacked, their compounds looted, and some subjected to sexual violence and to mock executions. Attacks on humanitarian personnel are prohibited under international humanitarian law and constitute a war crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC. It appears that the parties to the conflict continue to violate international humanitarian law. The Office reiterates that those bearing the greatest responsibility for such crimes must be brought to justice…."

UN 'must arrest Darfur suspects'
BBC News
June 8, 2007

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has urged the UN Security Council to help in the arrest of two Sudanese men suspected of war crimes in Darfur.

Humanitarian Affairs Minister Ahmed Haroun and Janjaweed leader Ali Muhammad Ali Abd al-Rahman, also called Ali Kushayb, are wanted on 51 counts.

The ICC prosecutor told the council they worked together systematically to attack civilians in Darfur.

The Sudanese government has rejected the international court's jurisdiction.

More than 200,000 people have died in the four-year conflict and some 2m are in camps after fleeing their homes.

A UN Security Council team is due in Khartoum on 17 June to discuss the issue with Sudan's president.

Eyewitnesses

In other developments:

* Outgoing UN head of humanitarian affairs in Sudan Manuel da Silva says he believes rebels in Darfur are ready to go back to the negotiating table for peace talks and are tired of fighting.
* The US has warned Sudan to accept the deployment of a joint UN-African Union in Darfur or face sanctions such as a no-fly zone.

Mr Haroun was a minister responsible for the Darfur portfolio in 2003 and 2004.

"No crime was committed there without Harun's intervention. He was the one who recruited the Janjaweed militia," Reuters news agency quotes the ICC prosecutor as saying.

"I have eyewitnesses who saw Ahmad Harun delivering weapons in his own helicopter to the militia in three different states in Darfur," Luis Moreno-Ocampo said.

"I have eyewitnesses watching Kushayb involved in the execution of prisoners, in the rape of women," he said.

In February, the two men were named by the ICC as suspects on a total of 51 counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

Correspondents say it is unclear whether Mr Kushayb is already in the custody of the Sudanese government for attacks committed in Darfur.

Earlier, Mr Haroun said the move against him was political and that he had a clear conscience.

In the past, Sudan has complained that the ICC has not indicted any Darfur rebels who it says are also guilty of murderous attacks.

[back to contents]

Uganda (ICC)

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents - Situation in Uganda

Intel Brief: A Distant Peace for Uganda
ISN Security Watch
By Anna Dunin
June 8, 2007

Peace negotiations between Uganda's government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) will likely fail because of the weaknesses of the LRA's representatives, an inappropriate structure and inadequate substance for negotiations, and a lack of influential mediators such as the US the EU or the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).

The major obstacle to the process will be disagreement over bringing alleged criminals to justice and the International Criminal Court's (ICC) role in that process. The ICC is highly unlikely to agree to amnesty for LRA commanders and drop their arrest warrants because of its fundamental belief that justice is the basis for peace.

Many international observers saw the peace process that began in July 2006 as the best opportunity in a decade to end the conflict in Uganda. Earlier negotiations lacked resources and leverage, and the new involvement of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) added potential to the process. Negotiations took place for the first time outside Uganda, in the capital of South Sudan, Juba. Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni, who had long relied on a military solution that aggravated the violence and forced Ugandans into internally displaced person (IDP) camps, signed the cessation of hostilities (COH) agreement with the LRA in August 2006.

Despite a lack of attacks and abductions, and the return home of 300,000 displaced people, the talks stalled because of disagreements over the agenda. The main issue was the ICC's indictments of top LRA commanders. Both parties also accused each other of violating the COH.

In January this year, the LRA delegation walked away from negotiations, demanding a new mediator and a new locale. The GoSS gave LRA delegates its presidential guards as part of a security arrangement to improve LRA confidence. Since then, the LRA delegates have walked out of the negotiations many times, citing various reasons, including security concerns and the partiality of the mediators.

According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the LRA delegation lacks competency, credibility and cohesiveness, and the sides negotiate without a structured and institutionalized process. Instead of negotiating issues in parallel, the talks deal with issues sequentially, allowing the rebels walk away anytime they cannot reach their goals. Mutual distrust and tension between the Ugandan government and the LRA, as well as their disagreement over solutions to the conflict and both sides continued allegations of war crimes, will continue to thwart the process.

The substance of the negotiations will also contribute to the failure of the peace talks. The negotiations in Juba should focus on the peace agreement, instead of becoming a forum to discuss solutions to political, economic and social problems behind the conflict. Meanwhile, the parties focus on the latter, and on 03 May 2007 signed an "Agreement on Comprehensive Solutions," in which they committed to finding solutions to the underlying causes of the conflict in Uganda.

While the US is unlikely to get involved in the negotiations as it would result in a de facto recognition of the ICC, the presence of other high-level negotiators or observers such as from the EU or one of the OSCE would focus much needed press attention on the talks.

Greater international engagement would add leverage and create confidence, as in the first stage of the negotiations the lack of involvement of any influential actors increased the mistrust between the parties. The involvement of South Africa, Kenya, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Tanzania and Mozambique in the current set of talks will likely add some accountability and confidence, but the presence of more influential players would increase the visibility of the peace talks. UN special envoy to the peace talks and former president of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano, lacks the leverage on his own to overcome the mutual distrust between the parties.

Once both sides resolve major concerns (the security of LRA fighters, representatives' allowances and assembly points) - which the LRA has previously used as excuses to stop the negotiations - the mediators will face other challenges related to the content of the peace agreements.

According to Peter Quaranto, a conflict analyst at the Uganda Conflict Action Network, the three main challenges that the negotiators will face this time will be mutual mistrust, lack of transparency and transitional justice. The major obstacles to the process will be disagreement over bringing alleged criminals to justice and the ICC's role in that process, as well as unwillingness of the parties to accept responsibility for atrocities. The failure by both sides to accept responsibility for war crimes is another major reason why the talks have stalled since 2006.

The LRA is expected to argue for the use of the traditional Acholi ritual mato oput, instead of the international system of justice. During mato oput, a criminal faces relatives of the victim and admits his guilt and asks for forgiveness.

The LRA asked the government to implement traditional local justice and named withdrawal of the ICC's indictments as the condition for any peace agreement. The LRA asked Chissano to argue to the UN Security Council (UNSC) for a 12 month suspension of indictments, volunteering for mato oput in return. The latter has never been used for such grave crimes of which LRA is accused. Also, Joseph Kony, the LRA leader, denies having committed atrocities, while admitting guilt and reconciliation are necessary components of mato oput. Experts say this traditional justice method is not enough, and Uganda, which can initiate the debate in the UNSC, is unwilling to discuss the rebels' situation until they reach a peace agreement.

Although the LRA indictments mean the Ugandan government should seek Kony's arrest, it continues to show a willingness to negotiate with LRA leaders for peace. Museveni granted amnesty to the LRA leadership in 2000 but excluded their four major commanders. In 2006, he extended the deal to the LRA's leaders in exchange for peace. However, in early 2007, various government officials assured the ICC of their commitment to its prosecutions.

As it has repeatedly done in the past, the ICC is highly likely to refuse to drop charges against the LRA leadership because of its belief that the continued impunity for the rebels is unlikely to result in peace. Despite amnesty and negotiations, the prosecutor of the ICC, Luis Moreno Ocampo, has a legal duty to prosecute the crimes against humanity the LRA committed in Uganda because Museveni referred the case to the ICC in 2003.

Moreno Ocampo claims accountability, not impunity, is a necessary condition for long-term peace. According to Richard Dicker, director of Human Rights Watch's International Justice Program, bringing justice is necessary to ensure peace in Uganda. Dicker claims that impunity of the LRA commanders would fuel future abuses in the country. Various human rights groups agree that the LRA leaders must face penalties that reflect the gravity of their crimes.

The ICC also claims that the LRA continues to commit crimes, as it is rearming and regrouping and has not released abducted women and children. LRA rebels claim that these women and children are their families, which makes it unlikely that the LRA will free them. Also, the director of Crisis Group Africa, Francois Grignon, asserts that the LRA is buying arms from Khartoum and recruiting fighters to rebuild their ranks.

The Rome Statute allows for the prosecutor to put a hold on or suspend prosecution if there is an effective and impartial process that deals with alleged criminals. According to Mark Ellis, executive director of the International Bar Association, it is unlikely that a Ugandan trial would be acceptable to the international community, as it is questionable whether Uganda is capable of and willing to hold war crimes trials for LRA commanders.

The UNSC could put a hold on the ICC's investigation or prosecution for 12 months under article 16 of the Rome Statute, and renew it after that period. According to Human Rights Watch, this action would be wrong, as in the absence of reliable judicial system in Uganda, a deferral would shield LRA leadership from prosecution.

SUDAN-UGANDA: "The Acholi were provoked" - Prof Morris Ogenga Latigo
IRIN
Interview with Professor Morris Ogenga-Latigo, Leader of the Opposition, MP Agago County and Observer at the peace talks in Ri-Kwangba
June 1, 2007

QUESTION: Why did you come to Ri-Kwangba?

ANSWER: Basically because I'm a member of the Acholi community and one of the leading political figures from that sub-region. In the peace process, it has for some time now been considered important to involve the political leaders from the sub-region in this process.

Q: Why do you think so little is known about what has been called one of the 'world's worst humanitarian disasters'?

A: We had a government in Uganda that was so embraced by the West when it came to power, and then when some of these things began to show, particularly the conflict in the north, it was a blemish that many people didn't want to talk about. In that silence, the conflict escalated and became a real humanitarian disaster that should have been addressed much earlier. Eventually it could no longer be hidden and people had to talk about it, and it had to be resolved, but by the time the international community had the courage to talk about it, it had become a terrible disaster for the community in those places.

Q: What is the Ugandan opposition doing about it – or are they preoccupied with the politics of power in Kampala?

A: As the opposition, our aim is that the government should talk to the LRA. That has been our struggle over a long period … all along we have been telling the government, look, this is a political issue, you can best resolve it through dialogue. The biggest role we played was to push government into talking to the LRA. Now we are observers to make sure things go well.

Q: How do you explain the fact that the conflict has gone on for 20 years without a military or political solution?

A: It is tough – we have always insisted the Museveni government had the military mind to go and change governments in [Democratic Republic of] Congo, in Rwanda, and therefore the military explanation was inadequate. All we thought was that either it was deliberate negligence or it was a gross under-estimation of the situation. By the time they realised, it had escalated into a scale of conflict that was shameful for the government. The other element is the resilience of the people in that region. They were able to keep to themselves, keep to their sub-region for so long when they could have all run away to other places and caused a refugee crisis that the international community would have responded to much earlier.

Q: How is the LRA perceived in Uganda?

A: In the beginning there was a gross misrepresentation of this conflict by the government: it was like the Acholis - the bad guys - versus the government. And therefore in the rest of the communities in Uganda, in the southern part, it was, well, if they are suffering, it's good punishment, good riddance. But over time people have realised this is a Ugandan conflict and has to be resolved by the collective response of all Ugandans. So over the last year we have had a tremendous national response – the urging of government to talk peace, and then the urging of everybody who can to provide humanitarian support.

Q: The leader of this movement, Joseph Kony, projects himself as a mystical, shadowy person. What do you think of him?

A: I think, being a scientist myself, I always understood the mysticism as the context within which they could easily operate and implement their agenda. It was nothing tangible. But they used it to influence those around them, even to impose their will on the population.

Since I first talked to Kony on the phone, and then met him – this is probably for the fifth time – I have no doubt he is a very intelligent person who knows how to manage the situation he is in. And who poses on the surface as a character that leads to too many people underestimating his capacity. Me, Kony and Otti, we understand each other … They are just human beings. To some extent I'm beginning to think they are now looking back, reflecting on some of the things that have happened. They are caught in the story of their war; the very many excesses that have been part of that conflict. And you can begin to discern some kind of worry - about their whole well-being, and how it will end for them, as this conflict is resolved. You can now see uncertainty coming in and therefore the human-ness in them begins to get exposed.

Q: But the person who everyone seems to deal with and negotiate with at the meetings is actually Vincent Otti?

A: Yes but it's only in those moments of physical interaction. Now when you talk to Vincent Otti when he's in the bush, Kony is always lurking behind. Otti is like the medium through whom Kony does his thing. It therefore puts Otti in a very central role. And maybe in terms of character, Otti doesn't have the calmness of character to sit back and watch, so he tends to go in and get engaged, because he has become a very prominent figure. Many people have mistaken him as the driving force. But no, it's still Joseph Kony who's driving the whole process.

Q: What do Ugandans feel about the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrants, compared with traditional justice mechanisms?

A: When President Museveni turned to the ICC, when they came into Uganda to do the preliminary investigations, we told them, you are entering a trap from which you will not emerge unscathed. The biggest challenge for the ICC now is they have found the traditional process is so strong it is virtually overwhelming their own, on the indictment of the LRA leaders. For them it is now a struggle to save ICC face, maintaining its authority. At the same time they recognise that it's not going to work that way – because the indicted leaders, particularly Joseph Kony and Vincent Otti, are central to delivering peace in northern Uganda. The demand for peace is so strong that the communities affected - particularly ours, the Acholi - are prepared to forgive through the traditional process for the sake of sustainable peace. And this runs counter to the ICC demand for these people to pay through the justice system. We are in a situation where the ICC will have to somehow find a common way of backing out of where they are.

The example we have, in Uganda, is the West Nile conflict under Idi Amin, which pitted the Acholi community and the West Nilers [against each other] in a situation where there was so much murder with impunity. When Amin was overthrown many of the local militia who went to West Nile were Acholi, from Lango, and they did all kinds of atrocious things. At the end of the day, the two communities met and we went through the Mato oput traditional system. Now, between us and the West Nilers, there is not a shred of ill feeling in relation to that past.

Q: But is it possible for the traditional justice system to deal with atrocities on such a mass scale - of abduction, rape, mutilations and killings? Mato oput was not designed to cope with that, was it?

A: Actually, it is not true that it deals with small-scale killings only. It is the principle that you must accept that when killings take place, you cannot reverse the deaths, and you cannot cling to it at the expense of the future. Therefore, we have the mechanism where we accept what has happened as having happened and we forge a common future. That is the basic principle, regardless of the scale. When applied, it works. What we anticipate is the LRA on the one side and our communities in the north on the other side together saying, look, this has happened – we cannot change what has happened. But for the sake of the future we must accept it; those who were responsible must accept the responsibility, we who were victims must forgive them. Then we say we must start with a clean slate. That's the basis. The scale is immaterial.

Q: One of the extraordinary features of this conflict is the child abductions. How do you forgive that?

A: It is just acceptance of the fact they happened, and that it can't be changed. The focus is now on the society trying to craft some future out of those who have been victims of this process. We are not going to focus, not in my community, on those who did it because it is a waste of time. In the end we can't change them; we must focus on the victims, make sure that they live some kind of normal life, that's where the traditional justice system comes in. Even when there is one single killing, the individual who is involved ceases to hold responsibility – it is his or her community, whether it is a household, a sub-clan or a clan, who then accept the responsibility for what happened. The individuals involved, they play no role.

Q: How did the LRA come to mobilise a young and traumatised army of children – can that be explained culturally?

A: When you try to explain this conflict, you need to go very far into the Acholi community. It can best be explained by the post-independence experiences of that community. Under Amin, they were very brutally murdered, extensively. When a change took place the initial reaction was, ok, let's see what happens. But when people started getting picked [arrested], they said this time, we are not going to be killed like before. And the community rose up with arms. Now in that confusion, those who had the cunning to understand the minds of the people, their vulnerability, took advantage and started moving towards building around them their own power bases, their own agenda for action. That's where people like Joseph Kony came in. That's where [Alice] Lakwena came in.

I must also say that when you look closely at the government of President Museveni, the Acholi community was easily provoked; they were easily made excitable. It was easy to draw them into a fight where you could get rid of many of the fighting forces within those communities – because it was a real threat that if the whole military structure that came out of Tito Okello's [he ousted Milton Obote in 1985 and was himself overthrown six months later by Museveni] government remained and regrouped and reorganised, it could have been a real political and military threat to the government. So they moved very early to get rid of that potential power base. As a consequence it generated a situation that became like cancer out of control.

Now that's what we see. When the LRA could no longer recruit, they had to abduct. And their strategy was abducting the kids – because the kids, after a few miles, would get completely lost, wouldn't know where they were, and had the capacity to withstand some of the pressures. They would get molded into the kind of fighting force wanted, more than the adults. And it was a strategy that worked very well for Joseph Kony. Too many of the kids who got abducted got absorbed completely into his system. They became real killing machines that made no distinction between relatives, between the communities they came from, and any other target to which they were directed.

Q: Are they motivated by any ideology, or just by fear?

A: Yes, it is fear, discipline – and excitement at what they were doing. They were not conscious of the moral ills behind what they were doing. It is exciting, you know, moving from Sudan, attacking. If you sit with them, they start telling you their stories. They tell you with relish – how they attacked this place, how such a big person came, and they shot at them, you know. For the kids, it's adventure. They wanted nothing. They didn't understand power; they didn't understand material gains; so it was adventure. And therefore they became the best instruments of Kony.

Q: The LRA espouses a return to Acholi traditions and the Ten Commandments as its ideological platform. What does that mean to the community?

A: They've used that very well, to maintain coherence in their group. For example, the group don't drink, they don't smoke; casual sex is out of the question. And that means the key elements that are the diversion to a military force were cut off. It ensured that Kony had a focused force. Even when they are young and small in number, you can send three of them from deep inside Sudan to do an operation in Uganda, and they will walk 500-600km and go and do that operation, and come back. It allowed them to survive, and that explains why they've survived for 20 years despite the military strength [of the Ugandan authorities]. And the Acholi community is very religious, and probably a large number of us believe in the Ten Commandments from our religious perspective, whether Catholics or Anglican.

Q: Even if the peace talks work, resettling the children will be a major humanitarian challenge.

A: Actually, the biggest fear for some of us is the post-conflict period. Because without conflict the international attention is quickly drawn elsewhere, and the efforts they put in terms of resources will not be there. Secondly, the challenge of reintegrating people into their normal community lives is so great. As soon as the blemish of IDP camps is gone, and the international community driving in or flying in and criticising the government is gone, the government will think its work is done, and that's going to be a big challenge.

Bringing Justice to the North
Institute for War and Peace Reporting
By Katy Glassborow and Uganda Radio Network journalists in Gulu
May 31, 2007

The ICC can only probe a limited number of crimes – is the Ugandan judiciary up to tackling the rest?

With the International Criminal Court only mandated to try crimes against humanity and war crimes committed from 2002 onwards, there's concern over whether Uganda's justice system is up to the task of tackling earlier cases and more recent ones that the ICC deems too low-level to take on.

The ICC is currently engaged in investigating crimes committed in northern Uganda, but the time limitation - set out in its founding statutes - means that it can only probe a relatively short period of the Lord's Resistance Army, LRA, insurgency, which broke out 21 years ago.

Crimes carried out before July 2002 – when the court was set up – will have to be investigated and tried by the Ugandan judiciary. So too will those that were allegedly committed by low-level suspects.

But human rights organisations are worried about the credibility and impartiality of Uganda's justice system and the government's tight grip on the judicial process.

This comes as on-off peace talks between the government and the LRA, currently ongoing in Juba and hosted by the government of south Sudan, consider issues of accountability and reconciliation.

Those involved with the peace talks are exploring national justice mechanisms to help facilitate a peace agreement, which, according to Human Rights Watch, HRW, include tribal systems, truth commissions and national trials. The LRA has threatened to return to war if the ICC doesn't drop indictments against its leaders.

For now, the prospect of national trials worries activists.

Back in March, HRW and other human rights movements called on the government of President Yoweri Museveni to stop intimidating civilian courts after armed soldiers stormed the High Court in Kampala, Uganda's capital, to re-arrest five men who had just been granted bail after fifteen months of detention.

The men are part of a group known as the "PRA suspects" who are charged with treason along with Dr Kizza Besigye, leader of the opposition Forum for Democratic Change, FDC, for their alleged membership of a shadowy rebel movement, the People's Redemption Army.

The Ugandan judiciary began a strike on March 5 in protest at the government's actions at the High Court, while demonstrators in Kampala were met by heavy police deployment and teargas. HRW said the events were a "grim reminder" of an earlier High Court siege, in November 2005, by the army's anti-terrorism unit that prevented the release on bail of the same men.

At that time, Besigye was the leading opposition candidate running against Museveni for the February 2006 presidential election.

"The security forces surrounded the High Court to intimidate the judges and thwart the decision to release these men on bail," said Georgette Gagnon, HRW's deputy Africa director.

"The Museveni government's attempt to intimidate the courts shows its profound lack of respect for the law."

If Uganda's courts are to try crimes related to the insurgency, HRW says there must be credible and independent investigations and prosecutions; an adherence to international fair trial standards; and appropriate penalties reflecting the gravity of the crimes.

And this can't come too soon, according to Ugandan human rights lawyer Barney Afako. He told IWPR that ever since the LRA began its insurgency in the north in 1986 there have been complaints that the government fails to investigate or prosecute crimes thoroughly.

Victims in the north say that soldiers of the Ugandan People's Defence Force, UPDF, have also committed atrocities, including murder and rape, against civilians in their bid to quash the LRA - but when arrests have been made of soldiers the charges made against them have simply petered out.

Elise Keppler, a lawyer with the International Justice Programme of HRW, told IWPR that human rights groups have been documenting serious human rights abuses, pre- and post-2002, by both the UPDF and LRA for many years.

"Due to the temporal limitations of the ICC, fair and credible prosecutions of crimes committed before 2002 will need to take place before other courts," said Keppler.

"There has been an accountability vacuum in the north, and there need to be investigations, prosecutions and appropriate punishment if members of the UPDF are implicated. If the military are failing to prosecute their own, they should be prosecuted in civil jurisdictions."

Because of the absence of police during the insurgency in the north, the UPDF made its own arrests and handed suspects to civilian courts. But some cases were retained in the military court system where the justice meted out was of questionable quality.

However, Afako argued that the perception of a lack of political will to prosecute crimes is exaggerated. The problem is that the Ugandan legal system is hampered by too few prosecutors and a general lack of sophistication to deal with complex operational demands, he said.

He said that there are examples of individual victims going through the civil law system to bring allegations of human rights abuses against members of the armed forces. In the main, these prosecutions have been initiated by non-government organisations and the parliament-appointed Uganda Human Rights Commission and have resulted in awards for damages. "The bill against the government is huge and the difficulty is how to enforce the payments," said Afako.

Afako believes that the period from the beginning of the LRA insurgency in 1986 up until 2002 be re-examined to allow investigations into the conduct of military criminal justice in relation to atrocities against the civilian population, and that there should be a commission of inquiry to make a prosecutorial assessments of whether there is enough reliable evidence to get convictions.

Investigations could be conducted by the Uganda Human Rights Commission, which began work ten years ago, into alleged human rights abuses, said Afako.

Under the ICC's Principle of Complementarity, the court must respect national justice systems and, under its Outreach and Jurisdiction, Complementarity and Cooperation Divisions, support local lawyers and judges to prosecute "lesser" suspects whilst it deals with key perpetrators.

The ICC can play a real role in "spurring improvement in serious crimes prosecutions in national courts for crimes committed pre- and post- 2002," said HRW's Keppler.

She also flagged the importance of the international community getting involved in building up Uganda's justice system, stressing that "programmes funded by major donors can promote positive developments in the justice system".

Whichever systems of justice are employed, they have to satisfy those most affected by the conflict – the victims. Northerners interviewed by IWPR tend to call for a multi-faceted approach to justice for crimes committed both before and after 2002.

Those who fled the bloody LRA insurgency and who are crammed into camps for internally displaced people have told IWPR that conflict resolution will fail if only one system is relied upon. Uganda's constitution recognises traditional tribal justice, and there is a strong feeling in the north that clan elders can handle justice and reconciliation far better than international or national legal systems.

Apart from the pastoral Karamajong of Uganda's "wild northeast", whose traditional justice demands blood for blood, many of the Ugandan clan and southern kingdom justice systems are fairly similar - so these could be knitted together to play a part in the national judicial process. However, this could take a long time to sort out.

Meanwhile, time is running out to find a solution to Uganda's peace versus justice conundrum. The threat in late May by the LRA's deputy leader Vincent Otti that the movement will return to war, if ICC war crimes indictments are not dropped against the LRA's five top leaders, lends fresh urgency to finding a durable solution which is palatable locally and internationally.

Forgiveness and Amnesia in Uganda
Institute for War and Peace Reporting
By Evelyn Kiapi, Gawaya Tegulle and Katy Glassborow
May 31, 2007

Can traditional justice mechanisms that offer a sense of closure to victims work in harmony with international law?

Since the Lord's Resistance Army embarked on its campaign of violence in northern Uganda in the late Eighties, there have been several attempts to end the insurgency through peace talks. Uganda's president Yoweri Museveni is now taking the same route.

After inviting the fledgling International Criminal Court, ICC, to conduct investigations in northern Uganda in December 2003, Museveni has changed tack and begun peace negotiations with the rebels, in an ongoing process that began last year and is being hosted by the government of South Sudan in Juba.

Some Ugandans believe Museveni's commitment to peace talks is not 100 per cent genuine, otherwise he would have approached the United Nations Security Council by now to request a retraction of the arrest warrants the ICC issued against top LRA leaders in October 2005.

Under amnesty laws which the president created six years ago, 17,000 LRA rebels who agreed to abandon warfare and renounce their crimes have been pardoned and reintegrated into their communities.

Many Ugandans agree that amnesty and reconciliation are the best way forward to bring peace to northern Uganda.

Others are keen to survey options which might not only end an insurgency that has cost an estimated 100,000 lives over the past two decades and forced more than1.6 million into internal refugee camps, but would also be palatable to the people directly affected by conflict as well as to the international community.

Albert Mugumya of the Kampala-based Centre for Conflict Resolution told IWPR that most northern Ugandans favour local forms of justice, which focus on forgiveness and reconciliation, rather than retribution under the punitive mechanisms offered by the ICC.

Furthermore, many people affected by 20 years of violence want a justice mechanism which brings the accused back to face the communities which suffered, so that victims can deal with them face to face.

"If you are not part of the process, it is hard to be healed," said Mugumya, who feels that Uganda should show that the conceptual tensions and procedural differences between international criminal justice and the desire for local solutions can be resolved "without condoning impunity".

Mugumya drew a comparison with Algeria, which last year implemented a limited amnesty programme in an attempt to heal the wounds of a civil war that has resulted in some 200,000 deaths since 1992.

"No one condemned the Algerians for wanting to draw a line under their terrible past," he said.

However he added a warning that if the solution amounts to "organised amnesia", it can only be a "temporary palliative".

"The act of forgetting silences victims and leaves wounds to fester," he said.

This is why many victims from the Acholi community, the ethnic group worst affected by the LRA insurgency, are advocating the "mato oput" tradition of reconciliation to deal with LRA rebels who surrender and emerge from the bush after being granted an official amnesty.

In order to return to their communities, the former rebel soldiers need to win agreement that the past can be put behind them by going through the mato oput ceremony, which as its name indicates involves all parties drinking a brew made from the bitter root of the oput tree.

The key to the ritual is that the offender must accept responsibility, ask for forgiveness, and pay compensation.

As Mugumya explained, "Such participatory local justice reasserts lost dignity".

"Mato oput involves the man or woman accepting responsibility for their actions and repenting for their crimes against their brothers and sisters," said the Right Reverend Baker Ochola, the retired Anglican bishop of the northern town of Kitgum.

"They then ask for the forgiveness of their community and pay reparations - sometimes in the form of a goat or a cow - to those they have wronged. Finally, they rejoin their community, without cruelty or victimisation."

But an admission of guilt could be a step too far for some of the LRA's commanders, for instance its leader Joseph Kony, who is unlikely to confess to anything as long as an ICC indictment exists with his name on it.

The key to mato oput is that it cannot work by proxy – the conflicting parties need to be physically present and active participants in the ceremony. Many Acholi people are therefore against a justice process at the Hague-based ICC, on another continent thousands of kilometres away from Uganda.

It is debatable whether mato oput can cope with atrocities as grave as war crimes and crimes against humanity. There are also doubts about whether it could provide the same kind of deterrent effect as an international trial followed by a prison term or a hefty fine.

Reconciliation remains the most important objective expressed by victims of violence in northern Uganda . But without some kind of punitive element, it is unclear whether perpetrators would feel free to continue raping, looting and killing with impunity.

Furthermore, the traditional methods of reconciliation used by the Acholi differ from those of neighbouring ethnic groups such as the Langi, Teso and Madi. That suggests it might be time for Uganda to formulate a court or set of traditional laws to act as an alternative or complement to the ICC.

In Rwanda, local Gacaca courts - meaning "justice on the grass" - complement the formal prosecutions pursued by the UN-backed International Criminal Court for Rwanda.

The Gacaca system is used across the whole of Rwanda, but since the ethnic groups of northern Uganda adhere to differing informal justice systems, there is no clear unified model that could easily replicate the Gacaca system.

Deo Rubumba Nkunzingoma, past president of the Uganda Law Society, told IWPR that the Acholi and Langi have justice systems that can be "written down, polished, and put side by side with international systems". But there would need to be an "internationally acceptable dimension to make sure punishments are not repugnant".

Nkunzingoma said any new system should have already have been set in motion by now, and he urged local and central government to get the ball rolling.

Truth and reconciliation commissions have played a part in healing wounds in South Africa and Sierra Leone and a similar commission could arguably play a part in Uganda.

Such commissions are not courts, but seek to determine the truth and hold individuals accountable for their actions. But some argue that in northern Uganda, victims want to move on rather than dwell on past atrocities.

In Nkunzingoma's view, the answer is a new system which is "a combination of international punitive mechanisms, including imprisonment, and a remedial mechanism of 'thou shall not do it again'".

This synthesis will show that the suspect has recognised that what he did is wrong, and that he has been punished and come out cleansed. Then, "everyone, locally and internationally, can see the accused was punished and will not commit the same crimes again," said Nkunzingoma.

However, he acknowledged that achieving this delicate balance will be difficult, as the international legal community will probably be slow to accept a justice mechanism that undermines the ICC.

Nkunzingoma warned that unless the process is handled carefully, other countries will start asking why Uganda is opting for local justice after inviting the ICC into the country. "It would undoubtedly be dangerous for our international relations," he said.

As the debate on alternatives or complements to the ICC continues, there is always the ultimate threat that hostilities will resume if negotiations fail.

During peace talks in Juba, Captain Paddy Ankunda, spokesman for the government negotiating team until he was posted elsewhere, punctuated almost every statement with warnings that the bullets would fly even faster than before if the talks failed.

Captain Ankunda's warning seemed to result from frustration with the slow pace of the Juba talks, as the LRA team continued to unleash demand after demand, most of which the government side deemed unacceptable.

Although the military option has not been successful in dealing with the LRA in the past, the geopolitical situation has changed in the Ugandan government's favour.

In earlier years, the LRA enjoyed the support of the Sudanese government in Khartoum, which provided arms and ammunition to the rebels as well as sanctuary in the vast south of the country.

At the time, Sudan's support from the LRA appeared to be payback for Uganda's alleged backing for the rebel Sudanese Peoples Liberation Army, SPLA. But the 2005 peace agreement between Khartoum and the SPLA reduced Sudan's strategic interest in the LRA, and its support for the group came to an end.

The LRA retreated into the Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC, taking advantage of the instability in that country. However, greater stability in Sudan coupled with the fast-improving situation in DRC following elections last year has been followed by both countries agreeing to arrest LRA members.

Uganda and DRC are both supporters of the ICC and have ratified its founding statute. Sudan, however, is opposed to the ICC and has not signed up to the Rome statute.

Khartoum initially signed an agreement with the ICC to arrest LRA suspects if they were found on Sudanese soil. But it retracted the offer after the ICC issued arrest warrants for a Sudanese minister and a pro-government militia commander in relation to events in the western Darfur region.

SUDAN-UGANDA: A Leadership Based on Claims of Divine Revelations
IRIN
May 30, 2007

Kony's leadership is based on claims of personal revelations from God and mystical charisma. Little is known about his past, other than the fact he was a former altar boy from Gulu, who claimed to have a vision while working in the field.

He is a cousin of Alice Lakwena, who in 1986 led the Holy Spirit Movement to within 40km of Kampala, Uganda's capital. Kony was reportedly offended when Lakwena shunned his help. The LRA leadership and Lakwena's family deny that the LRA is directly linked, or is the successor, to the Holy Spirit Movement. Both movements arose out of the political situation in the north, but had different tactics and beliefs.

Kony's style of leadership means the LRA has classic cult features, although the movement strongly denies it is a cult. The doctrine of the Ten Commandments and emphasis on Acholi tradition mean the LRA operates as a unique order with its own moral and social code. It demands unquestioning devotion and loyalty, inculcated through punishment and psychological pressure. It includes rituals of coercion, and is based on secretiveness and isolation.

Extreme discipline, including death, is part of the LRA social order, and it has focused on 'cleansing' its own community in the north. The structure of leadership also has cult-like features, with a charismatic but reticent mystical leader in Kony; and in Otti, as number two, the strategist, organiser and executor of orders.

Its agenda is based on reasserting tradition, and achieving political and social recognition in the north under a federalist system. With the onset of the peace process, the LRA has become more 'legitimised' and the lines blurred between the agenda of Ugandan opposition activists and the demands of the movement itself. Association with the LRA has taken on a new acceptability, or necessity, to the extent that politicians, lawyers, church and civic leaders from Uganda can openly attend the talks as observers or delegates.

During the talks in April, Kony fiddled nervously in the meetings, clasping a small black diary as if it were a prayer book. Tall and slight, he maintained the puzzled look of a spectator during most of the proceedings in the peace tent. Occasionally he became animated – a sudden wide smile and an extended hand – when greeted in Acholi by Ugandan observers from the church and the northern constituencies. He appeared to follow Otti's lead - often standing behind him, studying the mediators and participants silently, or following Otti's finger line by line as the terms of a new agreement were patiently read to him.

As soon as the sessions finished, Kony and the LRA delegates immediately headed back to the belt of trees in the DRC, beyond the water point.

People who know Kony say his demeanour is deceptive. Chief mediator Riek Machar – who has fought and talked with the LRA – believes that although Otti is the frontman, Kony remains in charge. "They are a very unconventional army, their tactics are unique to themselves … Vincent may be very outspoken, but I believe that they have one position."

Morris Ogenga-Latigo, MP for Agago County, also believes Kony is "driving the whole process", despite Otti's prominent role. "I have no doubt in my mind [Kony] is a very intelligent person who knows how to manage the situation he's in. And who poses on the surface with a character and attributes that lead to too many people underestimating his ability."

UGAND-SUDAN: Ri-Kwangba: Meeting Point
IRIN
May 30, 2007

Facilities have been established in Ri-Kwangba during the talks to effectively institutionalise the LRA in this remote location near the Sudan-Democratic Republic of Congo border - a significant political and social shift for the secretive group.

The meeting area – only a few hundred metres from the LRA bush headquarters in the DRC – has a water point, portable toilets, storage huts and a clearing for a large tent. When needed, international delegates are flown in and out by helicopter, and hundreds of plastic chairs, a generator, and a lunch of rice and stew brought in by road. Communication facilities and food have also been provided.

This is the only place where decisions can be made directly with the leaders. Kony and Otti are too concerned for their personal security to come to Juba, capital of Southern Sudan, where the official peace talks are taking place. But representation in Juba by LRA delegates is hampered by the movement's highly centralised structure and decision-making process.

Structure and tactics

The LRA is made up of small brigades - independent clusters of 10 to 20 soldiers. They work with speed and aggression and have been effective in spreading widespread terror with very few combatants. According to the Ugandan government, there are only 500-1,000 soldiers in total, many of the original LRA combatants having been killed in conflict or died of ill health, including HIV/AIDS.

However, these figures are disputed. Military sources and international observers in Southern Sudan estimate that there could be as many as 3,000 LRA fighters, with about 1,500 women and children in tow.

Highly centralised and disciplined, the LRA has shown itself responsive to ceasefire orders, but the brigade structure means orders can take time to reach the units. The Ugandan and Sudanese governments are aware of 'copycat' groups that ambush and kill in areas affected by the rebellion, which sometimes get blamed on LRA.

The LRA is notorious for mutilations and abductions. Sources close to the group say there have been four or five specific orders during the course of the conflict to deliberately inflict brutality, including mutilations and rape, in retaliation for government military operations that involved the cooperation of civilians.

The LRA has benefited from tacit, underground support from communities in northern Uganda, despite its brutality. Collaborators are used to provide information, batteries, rubber boots and other basic supplies. LRA raids target communication tools, medical supplies and food. Copycat groups are usually older men who go for high-value goods and cash.

Over the past few years, the trend has been a decline in attacks and sightings of the LRA, which were much stronger on the ground in the 1990s. Abductions and killings have been a feature of the movement, and have persisted in Sudan, with reports of about 15 Sudanese children known to have been abducted by the LRA over the past year. Abducted children are usually tied together and used as porters; their fate is unpredictable. Some are shot or killed, some are released, others are kept by the movement. Former abductees report being forced into murderous initiation rites. Forced to kill their relatives and friends, children feel they are unable to return to their families and community. Extreme fear is used to keep the children with the movement, while they undergo military training.

According to military sources in the region, the young recruits were trained in Sudan during the time the LRA received support from the government in Khartoum. The children are brought back into the bush, used as porters, and subjected to an initiation rite where they are forced to kill someone – often children who try to flee. "It is a way of bringing the child into a position of absolute obeisance," explained one source close to the LRA. Then they are sent to training facilities for about two months, and taught how to shoot, operate in the bush, raid and ambush, use hand and whistle signals, and take orders. After training they are deployed to different units.

LRA soldiers carry a variety of weapons, mostly Kalashnikovs, typically with bayonets. Many of the young soldiers have short beaded dreadlocks, and trademark rubber boots. Those in uniform are well presented, with insignia patterns based on Ugandan and Sudan government designs.

Since April, the LRA has agreed to assemble their troops in Ri-Kwangba, which entails moving their units from northern Uganda, and from east of the Nile in Southern Sudan, to the Sudan-DRC border. Earlier attempts to assemble at designated points failed, partly – say military observers – because the Ugandan military had blocked key areas of transit. The new agreement in April depended on support and assistance from the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A), which now leads mediation attempts in Southern Sudan.

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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Official Website of the ICTY

Four Trials Continue at Hague
B92
May 28, 2007

THE HAGUE -- First defense witness will give evidence in the trial for the artillery and sniper terror campaign against Sarajevo, 1994-1995.

Prosecution will continue its case at the trials for Srebrenica and Žepa crimes, Herceg Bosna and the KLA crimes in Kosovo.

The first defense witness will continue his evidence at the trial of Dragomir Miloševi?, former commander of the Bosnian Serb Army (VRS) Sarajevo-Romanija Corps charged with the artillery and sniper campaign between August 1994 and the end of the war in Bosnia.

Stevan Veljovi? was the operations officers in the Corps staff at the relevant time. Judge Robinson's trial chamber has allowed Milosevic's defense to call 63 witnesses. Their examination should take a total of 145 hours – 35 court days.

The Chamber wants the defense to rest its case by 24 August. After that, the parties will present their closing arguments, and the judgment is expected to be rendered by the end of October or early November.

The trial of Vojislav Šešelj, leader of the Serbian Radicals, should begin before the same trial chamber in November. Šešelj is charged with crimes against humanity in Croatia, Bosnia and Vojvodina.

On Tuesday, the prosecution will continue its case at the trial of the seven Bosnian Serb military and police officers charged with the crimes in Srebrenica and Žepa in July 1995, at the trial of the six former Bosnian Croat political and military leaders charged with the crimes in the so-called Herceg Bosna in 1993 and 1994, and the trial of the three former KLA commanders charged with the crimes against Serbian, Albanian and Roma civilians in 1998.

The trial of Ljube Boskoski and Johan Tarculovski, for crimes against Albanian civilians in the village of Ljuboten near Skoplje in August 2001, has been adjourned for a week. The trial of the six former political, military and political officials from Serbia charged with the crimes against Kosovo Albanians has also been adjourned until the start of the defense case, scheduled for 6 August.

Key Serb war crimes fugitive arrested
Associated Press
Dusan Stojanovic
May 31, 2007

BELGRADE, Serbia (AP) -- A former Bosnian Serb general who is considered the third most wanted war crimes fugitive in the Balkans was arrested on the Bosnia-Serbia border Thursday, police said.

Zdravko Tolimir, indicted by the U.N. war crimes tribunal, was a top aide to the wartime Bosnian Serb military commander, Gen. Ratko Mladic, during the slaughter of up to 8,000 Bosnian Muslims in Srebrenica in 1995 - the worst single atrocity in Europe since World War II.

Olga Kavran, the spokeswoman for the chief U.N. war crimes prosecutor for the former Yugoslavia, Carla Del Ponte, said they were informed of Tolimir's arrest by the Bosnian Serb Prime Minister Milorad Dodik.

Kavran said preparations for Tolimir's transfer to the U.N. detention unit near The Hague, Netherlands, were under way.

Tolimir, who was reported to have organized Mladic's escape from justice, was arrested after a major security sweep of the border region that included helicopters and anti-terrorist units, the Bosnian Serb police said.

Bosnian Serb spokeswoman Tamara Despic said the Bosnian Serb police and the Serbian police cooperated in Tolimir's arrest and that "his transfer to The Hague is in process."

"Tolimir was considered the mastermind of the actions to shelter Mladic for a long time," Rasim Ljajic, a Serbian government minister in charge of cooperation with the U.N. tribunal, told state television.

Tolimir was considered by U.N. war crimes prosecutors to be the third most wanted fugitive after Mladic and Bosnian Serb wartime political leader Radovan Karadzic, who are both still at large.

"We welcome the arrest of Gen. Tolimir," Kavran said. "We hope that the remaining two charged with genocide, Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, will be arrested soon."

As a ranking intelligence and security officer during Bosnia's 1992-95 war, Tolimir was charged by the U.N. tribunal with genocide, murder, persecutions, forcible transfer and deportation, and other inhumane acts.

The charges say that he "committed, planned, instigated, ordered, and otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation, and execution of the crimes" against non-Serbs during the war, including in Srebrenica.

The indictment alleges that, "with an intent to destroy a part of the Bosnian Muslim people as a national, ethnical, or religious group ... (Tolimir) killed members of the group by planned and opportunistic summary executions."

The "large scale systematic murder," the indictment says, began on July 13, 1995, and continued for days until the "entire Muslim population had been either removed or fled" from Srebrenica and the nearby enclave of Zepa by November 1995.

The European Union welcomed Tolimir's arrest, describing it as "an important step towards bringing to justice all remaining fugitives."

"Full cooperation with the (U.N. war crimes tribunal) is not only an international obligation, but also a key step to achieve lasting reconciliation in the Western Balkans region," EU Enlargement Commissioner Olli Rehn said in a statement.

Stankovic Still at Large
BIRN Justice Report
June 1, 2007

Radovan Stankovic's escape from Foca prison has still not been explained. However, according to statements by the police of Republika Srpska, the search continues.

Seven days after his escape from prison in Foca, where he was serving a 20-year sentence for war crimes, it is still not known where Radovan Stankovic is hiding.

Republika Srpska police announced on Friday 1st June that the State Agency for Investigation and Protection (SIPA) had taken over the investigation into Stankovic's escape and that the police forces in BiH were searching for him.

The Chief of Administration of the Criminal Police in Republika Srpska, Gojko Vasic, has said that, according to information available to the police, Radovan Stankovic is in Montenegro.

"He was seen there, and the police in Pljevlja are trying to determine his current location and arrest him", said Vasic at a press conference.

Vasic also said that SIPA staff inspected the apartments of Radovan Stankovic and his brother in Foca in the evening on 31st May. Three persons were arrested as a result of the operation.

The RS Police Directorate have denied allegations by some media outlets in BiH that their officers had been involved in Stankovic's escape and explained that the personnel working in prisons were not RS police officers but employees of the correctional facilities.

Radovan Stankovic, a former member of the Republika Srpska Army, was sentenced by the Court of BiH to 20 years imprisonment for crimes committed in Foca municipality during 1992. The verdict indicates that Stankovic was one of those responsible for the establishment and functioning of a women's detention camp in Karaman kuca, in which the youngest detainee was 12 and the oldest 24 years old.

Milorad Dodik, Prime Minister of Republika Srpska, said that he thought "it was not appropriate for the Court of BiH to send Stankovic to Foca to serve his sentence because he was born there and had school mates and friends".

The Prime Minister also said that "almost all staff" in the Foca prison would be replaced and that "the nine guards who let Stankovic escape deserve to be imprisoned until it is determined how this happened".

The Office of the High Representative (OHR) in BiH has also reacted by expressing dissatisfaction by Stankovic's escape and asking for a detailed investigation of the escape. OHR has also approved the allocation of two EUPM BiH staff to the investigation in order to help the local police.

The High Representative has also said that Stankovic's escape points to "all the inadequacies of the overcrowded and weakly financed prison system in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as to the need for the establishment of urgent coordination between the law implementation and judicial bodies in Bosnia and Herzegovina".

Christian Schwarz-Schilling has announced that he will meet with relevant State institutions and potential international partners to discuss measures that could be undertaken in order to speed up the activities within the State Prison Project.

No proof of mass grave near Raška
Beta
8 June 2007

MAJDAN -- A judge has told journalists there were no traces of a suspected mass grave on the administrative boundary with Kosovo.

Belgrade's War Crimes Court judge, Milan Dilpari?, said Friday forensic examination of the Rudnica-Majdan site near Raška, had not yielded any evidence that it may contain human remains.

The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) also confirmed that no proof that the site was a mass grave was found. However, the committee's representative, Krasimir Naumov, said this "did not mean the procedure would not be started again".

Chairman of the Government's Missing Persons Commission told the media Belgrade and Priština cooperated well during the several days of excavation at the site.

The probe into the suspected mass grave that allegedly contained up to 500 bodies of Albanian victims from the 1999 conflict started on Tuesday.

Several witnesses claimed that at the beginning of June 1999, during the NATO bombing campaign, as many as 350 bodies were transported in four trucks from unknown locations in Kosovo and buried in the Raška region in southern Serbia.

The War Crimes Prosecution filed a request with the District Court to launch an investigation into the allegations in order to determine whether the site in question contained the bodies.

U.N. says it has immunity in Bosnia suit
Associated Press Writer
Edith M. Lederer
June 8, 2007

UNITED NATIONS (AP) -- The United Nations said Friday it has immunity from a lawsuit by survivors of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre in Bosnia but remains committed to assisting those affected and bringing the perpetrators to justice.

Thousands of survivors of Europe's worst massacre since World War II sued the United Nations and the Dutch government Monday for their failure to protect civilians in Srebrenica when Bosnian Serb forces overran the U.N. safe haven in 1995 and slaughtered up to 8,000 men and boys.

U.N. spokeswoman Marie Okabe said Friday that the United Nation had just received the legal documents relating to the case.

She said Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon joins the survivors in demanding justice and "the international community should not rest" until Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic and his wartime military chief, Gen. Ratko Mladic, are apprehended and brought to justice.

The U.N. will not rest, she said, "until it's fully equipped to prevent such tragedies from occurring in future within its peacekeepers' midst."

Asked whether that meant the United Nations would not be seeking to assert immunity and have the case against the organization dismissed, Okabe said: "The fact that the U.N. is immune from the legal process under the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations in no way diminishes the U.N.'s commitment to assist the people of Srebrenica in the aftermath of this tragedy."

The 1948 convention states that the U.N. and its property "shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any particular case it has expressly waived its immunity."

Since the legal papers just arrived, Okabe said, "I don't know what the next step is."

The degree of culpability of the U.N. and its Dutch soldiers in the killings is fiercely debated.

During the 1992-95 Bosnian war, the U.N. declared Srebrenica - which had been besieged by Bosnian Serb forces - a safe area for civilians. But around 450 Dutch soldiers on peacekeeping duty stood by helplessly as thousands of Bosnian Serb forces stormed the area in July 1995.

In the chaos, Dutch soldiers even assisted in separating the women from the men, who were taken away in buses by the Serb forces and killed, their bodies plowed into mass graves.

An independent study by the Netherlands Institute for War Documentation cleared the Dutch troops of blame, noting they were outnumbered, lightly armed, undersupplied, and under instructions to fire only in self-defense.

However, the institute's 2002 report assigned partial blame to the Dutch government for setting the troops up to fail, prompting the Cabinet of Prime Minister Wim Kok to resign.

In evidence-gathering civil hearings in 2005, a lawyer for the Dutch state argued that compensation claims should be directed at the perpetrators of the massacre: Mladic and Karadzic.

About 200 survivors from the group known as the Mothers of Srebrenica accompanied lawyers as they delivered the civil summons at the Dutch Supreme Court Monday, where claims against the state must be filed.

The case will eventually be heard by the Hague District Court. Dutch authorities are expected to pass on details to the U.N., and must file a written reply within several months.

A report commissioned by former U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan admitte "errors of judgment" regarding Srebrenica in 1999 and highlighted a series of U.N. reforms to prevent a repetition.

The Dutch government has accepted "political responsibility" for the mission's failure, and gives around $20 million in aid to Bosnia annually, of which a third is reserved for projects related to rebuilding Srebrenica.

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