War Crimes Prosecution Watch

Cambodian Extraordinary Chambers (ECCC)

Official Website of the Extraordinary Chambers
Official Website of the Khmer Rouge Trial Task Force
Official Website of the United Nations Assistance to the Khmer Rouge Trials (UNAKRT)

Hun Sen's Hand in Genocide Trial Delays?
Inter Press Service News Agency
by Marwaan Macan-Markar
November 27, 2006

The long-delayed special tribunal to prosecute the surviving leaders of the genocidal Khmer Rouge regime has hit a verbal barrage that exposes the murky side of Cambodian politics.

The prime mover, whose actions are being viewed with alarm in some quarters in the country, is Ky Tech, president of the Cambodian Bar Association (CBA). Over a week ago, he demanded that foreign lawyers stop participating in the tribunal -- known officially as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).

By Wednesday, his demand to make the exercise of legal representation a completely Cambodian one, despite local lawyers being poorly trained or lacking knowledge of international law, had intensified. ‘'We are being violated by foreigners,'' Ky Tech was quoted as having told the English language ‘Cambodian Daily.'

Such animosity resulted Friday in the International Bar Association (IBA) abruptly stopping a training programme that was to be held this week to make Cambodian lawyers sensitive to the scope of justice in cases dealing with crimes against humanity, a charge that the Khmer Rouge leaders face.

The CBA has issued instructions ‘'forbidding lawyers from attending a training programme'' planned by the IBA and the ECCC, states the IBA on its website. ‘'The Bar's president, Ky Tech, has publicly threatened that ‘measures' will be taken against any attendee, and against the IBA's international participants.''

‘'The Bar's actions represent a disturbing development in the functioning of international justice, placing obstacles in the path of bringing those accused of international crimes to trial,'' says Mark Ellis, executive director of the London-based IBA. ‘'The IBA's programme was intended to improve the quality of legal services and the administration of justice in Cambodia, and help educate and inform the Cambodian public about international justice.''

The IBA's involvement in strengthening legal systems faced with the challenge of handling war crimes tribunals is spread across regions where the murder of civilians on a mass scale has occurred. It has trained lawyers, prosecutors and judges involved in special tribunals that dealt with the crimes against humanity in former Yugoslavia and, more recently, training ‘'the judges of the Iraqi High Tribunal.''

So the objections to the IBA's involvement in the Cambodian tribunal has given rise to speculation that Ky Tech's motives may not be his alone, or that of the CBA. After all, the country's justice system is known for its questionable record on upholding human rights, being heavily politicised and even accused of corruption.

‘'The CBA president has become vocal to a degree that it is hard to believe that he is saying these things without political backing,'' Theary Seng, executive director of the Centre for Social Development (CSD), a non-governmental organisation (NGO), said in a telephone interview from Phnom Penh. ‘'It seems to be aimed to either slow the process, or even stall it. This is worrying.''

Cambodian human rights groups are equally alarmed, more so because they are aware of who Ky Tech's political patrons are. ‘'There can be some political influence behind this statement,'' Ny Chakrya, a ranking member of the Cambodian Human Rights and Development Association, a Phnom Penh-based NGO, told IPS. ‘'Some CBA lawyers work closely with the CPP (Cambodian People's Party). Ky Tech is pro-CPP.''

Such allegations directed at the governing CPP, led by Prime Minister Hun Sen, are not the first pointing to its attempts to scupper a legal process that Cambodian civilians have been yearning for. The increasingly authoritarian Hun Sen has been a serial opponent of the special tribunal ever since the United Nations began talks with the Phnom Penh regime over a decade ago to create the ECCC.

Hun Sen's sensitivity towards the ECCC was on display in May, when he lashed out at human rights groups who called into question Cambodia's choice of judges to sit on a tribunal that stands out -- unlike the ones for Rwanda and former Yugoslavia -- in having a combination of local and international jurists to be part of the entire legal process.

He ‘'likened his critics to perverted sex-crazed animals, among other things,'' the Hong Kong-based Asian Human Rights Commission, a regional rights lobby, said on the occasion. Human rights groups were not happy at the choice of Ney Thol, an army general and president of Cambodia's military court, being among the 17 local jurists for the ECCC. He has a record of denying the right for lawyers of the accused to call their own witnesses and to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses.

What is more, a question still hangs in the air over Hun Sen if his name is dragged into the tribunal's proceedings, which formally got underway this year after years of delay. He was a member of the Khmer Rouge till he defected to join forces with the Vietnamese troops that drove out Pol Pot, the leader of that brutal regime, from power in 1979.

During their reign of terror between 1975-79, this extreme Maoist group, which wanted to create an agrarian utopia, was responsible for the death of close to 1.7 million people, nearly a quarter of this poor South-east Asian country's population at that time. The victims were executed or died of forced labour or famine.

Pol Pot died in 1998, evading justice. But other leaders of the brutal regime have survived, like Kaing Khek Eav, also known as ‘Duch,' who presided over the Toul Sleng interrogation centre in the Cambodian capital, where 14,000 people accused of being traitors died and only 12 inmates survived.

For Cambodian women like Theary Seng, the thought of further delay in the ECCC's work will only add pain to a public deeply traumatised by Khmer Rouge attrocities and still searching for answers as to why it happened. It is reflected in the public meetings her NGO has been running since early this year to prepare the public for this unprecedented trial.

‘'We bring experts from the ECCC to these meetings so that the people from the villages can get direct answers from them,'' she adds. ‘'There are so many questions out there about the KRT (Khmer Rouge Trial).''

At the most recent meeting in a province, an elderly man asked, ‘'I have waited for 30 years. Who ordered people to be killed?'' In that account, which appeared in an edition of the ‘Phnom Penh Post,' another man said, ‘'They murdered six members of my family in Takeo. In Kratie I went to jail with my family. I beg the NGOs to find the power to give me and my family justice.''

Cambodia: Government Interferes in Khmer Rouge Tribunal
Human Rights Watch
December 5, 2006

Donors Should Recognize How Government Tactics Threaten Entire Process

The Cambodian government must end its interference in the mixed national and international tribunal set up to prosecute crimes by senior Khmer Rouge leaders and others most responsible for Khmer Rouge crimes, Human Rights Watch said today.

A recent week-long meeting of Cambodian judges and their United Nations-appointed international counterparts failed to agree on internal rules for the tribunal, which is officially known as the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia (ECCC).

Acting on instructions from government officials, Cambodian personnel participating in the meeting delayed adoption of the draft rules, reversing earlier progress in the drafting process. The result is that the tribunal remains unable to launch investigations or prosecutions in accordance with international standards or even Cambodian law.

“Adopting the internal rules is crucial to ensure that the tribunal adheres to international fair trial standards and an impartial interpretation of Cambodian law,” said Brad Adams, Asia director of Human Rights Watch. “Many of the Khmer Rouge leaders are old and increasingly frail, but until the rules are adopted, prosecutions and trials cannot move forward. Political interference has brought the whole process to a screeching halt.”

In comments submitted to the tribunal on November 17, Human Rights Watch called for changes to the rules to meet international fair trial standards, specifically that there would be no in absentia trials, that defense counsel would be independent and effective, and that all trials would be public.

Cambodian lawyers and nongovernmental organizations have called for provisions to guarantee meaningful participation and protection of victims and witnesses, outreach to rural Cambodians to inform them about the trials and ensure that they can participate as civil parties, and authorization for victims’ associations and human rights NGOs to act as civil parties without having to register their organizations with the government.

Obstructionist tactics at the meeting on the internal rules were reportedly led by ECCC prosecutor Kong Srim, a protege of Deputy Prime Minister Sok An, who is Prime Minister Hun Sen’s most senior and trusted political lieutenant. As a prosecutor at the Appeals Court, Kong Srim developed a reputation for handling cases in a political manner rather than according to the law and the facts: he prosecuted suspects in absentia, played a key role in the release of Hun Sen’s nephew, Nhim Sophea, against whom there was compelling evidence of murder, and was crucial in engineering the imposition of the deputy prime minister’s candidate, Ky Tech, as president of the Cambodian Bar Association.

As documented in numerous reports by the United Nations, international legal organizations and Cambodian NGOs, the Cambodian judiciary and legal system remain under the tight control of the government. The government has ensured the appointment to the ECCC of Cambodian judges, prosecutors and security personnel who are politically loyal to the prime minister, the deputy prime minister and the national police chief, Hok Lundy. Such political control mechanisms are aimed at preventing judges and prosecutors from acting independently and conducting fair trials free from political interference.

Throughout the negotiations with the United Nations to establish the ECCC, Hun Sen and the Cambodian government engaged in a pattern of delay and obstruction, which was set out in detail by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in a report to the UN General Assembly. (See UN document A/57/769, “Report of the Secretary-General on Khmer Rouge trials,” at www.un.org.) The government has long tried to bog down efforts at creating the tribunal and, now, at making it functional, through seemingly endless and often fruitless negotiations, which absorb huge amounts of time, funding and expertise, but result in little or no substantive improvements.

“Government control over the Cambodian judiciary in the Khmer Rouge tribunal has always been a grave concern,” said Adams. “The fact that the government is already obstructing the process on ‘technical’ grounds should serve as a wake-up call for donors who have chosen to ignore Cambodian realities.”

Based on past government practices, Human Rights Watch is concerned that the latest wrangling over the internal rules may be a prelude to public attacks on the tribunal’s international staff, both to drive out particular individuals and to discourage others enough to bring about their resignations.

For the past 15 years, the Cambodian government has consistently attempted to silence, dismiss or undermine UN and other international personnel in Cambodia who operate independently and professionally and are seen as a threat to the government’s continued control of the judicial system. Hun Sen has vituperatively attacked all four UN human rights special representatives to Cambodia and the UN human rights office in Phnom Penh for their consistent and well-documented reports on human rights abuses, including extrajudicial killings and unfair trials, as well as the judiciary’s incompetence, corruption and lack of independence. While international donors have often called for reform of the judiciary as one of the highest priorities for Cambodia, the government has failed to adopt meaningful reforms.

“The government has long feigned accommodation with the UN system and international community in order to maintain its control over the judiciary,” said Adams. “The UN and donors must not allow this to happen this time.”

Human Rights Watch also expressed serious concern about the politically controlled Cambodian Bar Association’s attacks on the proposed ECCC Defense Office and plans for the training of Cambodian lawyers by the International Bar Association. The Cambodian Bar Association threatened legal action against Cambodian lawyers planning to attend a training on international standards by the International Bar Association in Singapore, causing it to cancel the training and to issue a strong statement condemning the move. Last year, when an independent candidate was elected president of the Cambodian Bar Association, the government-backed candidate, Ky Tech, used the politically controlled court system to have the election overturned. Ky Tech subsequently was elected as president, and it was he who ordered Cambodian lawyers not to attend the IBA training.

Though some progress has been made over the past decade, Cambodian courts generally give little respect to the right to an effective defense. The Cambodian government has repeatedly given assurances to the United Nations that arrangements would be made to allow full-fledged participation in defense by foreign lawyers, thereby ensuring that defendants would have counsel of their choosing. But the government is now obstructing this.

“The trials will not be credible unless defendants are provided a credible defense,” said Adams. “Given the well-documented problems with trials in Cambodia, the government and Bar Association should be going out of their way to ensure the reality of fair trials, rather than attacking the defense office.”

Future discussions of the internal rules will show whether it is possible for the ECCC to conduct trials that implement Cambodian and international law in an independent and impartial manner. Human Rights Watch urged both Cambodian and international personnel of the ECCC to pursue the objective of fair trials in accordance with international standards, keeping in mind that it is the Cambodian people who are the intended beneficiaries of this process.

“The international community needs to follow the Cambodian tribunal closely,” said Adams. “We want this tribunal to succeed. But if it becomes clear that the process is hopelessly politicized and obstructed, then the UN should withdraw its support to avoid becoming involved in a substandard trial that would be a disservice to itself and to millions of Cambodians.”

Big question mark hangs over Khmer Rouge trial
Reuters
by Ed Cropley
December 7, 2006

The courthouse is finished, a statue of its guardian spirit stands imposingly outside and prosecutors are wading through reams of documents relating to the 1.7 million victims of the "Killing Fields".

Despite all this, efforts to try Pol Pot's top henchmen for the Khmer Rouge atrocities of 30 years ago hang in the balance due to a major disagreement between Cambodian and foreign judges over the nuts and bolts of the joint court.

Last month, a week-long meeting of both sides to hammer out the hundreds of rules and guidelines governing everything from admissibility of evidence to witness protection to the height of the judges' chairs resolved precisely nothing.

A source familiar with the talks said the Cambodian officials -- products of a politicised judiciary described by the United Nations in 1999 as "deficient in most important areas" -- simply refused to negotiate.

"There was a clear attempt to stall it, which is disturbing," the source said.

Court spokesman Peter Foster acknowledged the Cambodians "spoke with a common voice", but said its primary concern was "not to approve anything that violated the Cambodian legal system".

Amid speculation about the hidden hand of Prime Minister Hun Sen -- a former Khmer Rouge commander not linked to any atrocities -- diplomats said the $56 million U.N.-backed process could fall apart before the prosecution names its first suspect.

"If they don't shape up in the next two months, there won't be a trial at all," a Western diplomat in Phnom Penh said.

Foreign lawyers and judges drafted in to ensure the process is just would not compromise on quality, another diplomat said.

"You have people with major reputations and they're not going to take part in something that does not meet international standards," the diplomat said. "They've made that quite plain."

POLITICS OR LOGISTICS?

Critics of Hun Sen jumped on the impasse as evidence he had been spooked by the speed and rigour with which Canadian prosecutor Robert Petit was working and needed to apply the brakes.

The Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, as the court is named officially, are mandated only to go after Khmer Rouge "senior leaders" and those "most responsible" for the atrocities committed during Pol Pot's 1975-79 reign of terror.

After Pol Pot's death in 1998, that was always assumed to mean "Brother Number Two" Nuon Chea, ex-President Khieu Samphan, ex-Foreign Minister Ieng Sary and a few others, including Duch, head of the Tuol Sleng "S-21" interrogation centre, and military supremo Ta Mok, who died in July.

But, the theory goes, maybe Petit was casting his net a little too wide and a little too close for comfort for a government still laden with ageing Khmer Rouge cadres.

A veteran of genocide tribunals in Rwanda and Sierra Leone, Petit said the slow progress was to be expected.

"Even if you'd put 20 Canadian judges in that room, I'm not sure you would have got any more results," he told Reuters.

"Everybody here is still committed to making this work and to having a good trial," Petit said. "A bad trial would be worse than no trial. It has to be done right, or not at all."

A separate sub-committee is now trying to draw up the rules, a task which court officials hope will be completed by February. If that all goes smoothly, Petit and his Cambodian colleague should be able to launch their first prosecutions in early March.

"We're withholding judgment in the hope that the difficulties encountered turn out to be logistical rather than political," said Heather Ryan of the Open Society Justice Initiative, a legal monitoring organisation.

At the personal level, the two sides do not seem to have got off on the right foot.

"It seems to me that the international lawyers consider the Cambodian lawyers to be incompetent," said Cambodian Bar Association head Ky Tech, embroiled in a related spat with the International Bar Association over external legal training.

For a tragedy whose roots are buried in the murky politics of the Cold War, it is also unsurprising that many see forces working beneath the surface.

Diplomats said China had been lobbying hard for Hun Sen to derail the trial because of the dirt it is sure to rake up on Beijing's support for Pol Pot and its efforts to export revolution to a region where it now has major strategic and economic stakes.

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Democratic Republic of the Congo (ICC)

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents - Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo

The Implications of the Peace Process for the DRC
AllAfrica.com - Fahamu
by Dieu-Donné Wedi Djamba
November 30, 2006

The International Criminal Court (ICC) has indicted LRA leader Joseph Kony and four of his lieutenants for crimes against humanity and war crimes committed during their 20-year-old rebellion. The government has proposed a traditional form of justice, Mato Oput, to replace the ICC indictments. Dieu-Donné WEDI DJAMBA explores the implications such a move will have for the post-conflict Democratic Republic of Congo, where the national judicial system is in collapse, and the only alternative left for victims of war to seek justice from is the ICC. This article is the last installment of a two-part series. The first article, entitled "The Ugandan Peace Process in Perspective" www.pambazuka.org/en/category/comment/38526 was published last week.

The ICC determines whether a State's criminal procedure, including non-party States' criminal procedures, conforms with the principles of "due process" or not. The standard adopted by the ICC for its determination is "the minimum guarantees" provided by the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).[1] And, Mato Oput may not conform to this principle of "due processes".

Furthermore, there is need to improve Mato Oput for it to be suitable as an alternative to the ICC. This raises the question whether still it remains a possibility to see Kony and his senior commanders standing trial under Mato Oput, because the ICC's Rome Statute provision article 17(admissibility principle) [2] provides that a case being investigated or prosecuted by a State member can be admissible to ICC(art.17,(1)a and b) but not reversed.

Indeed, there is jurisprudence for the ICC to prosecute Kony and his senior commanders because the Ugandan government itself referred the case to the international criminal court.

It must be noted that in order for the ICC to drop a case already at the investigation, prosecution or trial phase, and for a State to continue with the same case, this will create an judicial unsafe (delay of process). It would also be important to find out what happens if once again the same case became admissible to the ICC under articles 17(1)a and b after being handed over to a concerned State by ICC under the Complementarity principle.

Therefore, if Mato Oput will apply the international law standard, it will be helpful for the future case. Secondly, Acholi people are asking for Kony and his senior commanders to be prosecuted through Mato Oput. [3] But do they (Kony and other) ask for any prosecution by Mato Oput applying an international law standard? The possibility is they may ask for amnesty in order to avoid prosecutions. I am also of the argument that even if the Mato Oput has an international law standard it would not be the best option for Kony and his senior commanders.

The withdrawal of the warrants of arrest

Another threat faced by the ICC in the Ugandan peace process is the demand to withdraw warrants of arrest against the LRA leaders, which could set an unfortunate precedent for other ICC cases.

The wanted LRA leaders want the warrants of arrest withdrawn before they will emerge from the bush to sign the peace agreement. "The ICC warrants of arrest against the LRA leaders should be dropped, so that a peaceful conclusion to talk can be reach", said the LRA spokesman Obonyo Olweny. [4] Otti Vincent, one of the wanted LRA leaders, said in a call to a Gulu-based radio station that "Kony and I can not attend the peace talks although they wanted one of the top leaders of the LRA to attend. We are afraid of the ICC indictment on us. If you can convince the Uganda government to withdraw the case at the ICC, we are ready to come out of the bush freely".[5] And he warned "there will be no peace deal unless international indictment for the top rebels are dropped".[6]

Uganda has offered the five rebels leaders a blanket amnesty if they agree to a peace deal, and hinted at a possible negotiation with the ICC over the indictment. [7] The Uganda peace talks mediator, Dr Riek Machar, has taken a middle position to the LRA's demand that warrants of arrest be withdrawn, saying "we are not telling the ICC to stop what they are doing....We are just asking them to give the peace process a chance."[8]

Contrary to Machar's view, the ICC's Prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo urged that the best way to finally stop the conflict is to arrest the top leaders. And he added that "Kony will eventually face the trial."[9]

The ICC involvement in northern Uganda is viewed as a complication by all sides. While the ICC prosecutions have been an important factor in bringing the LRA and the government to the table, they now limit the options available to mediation because they and the broad international community are unlikely to accept a deal providing a broad amnesty and lacking strong justice and accountability mechanisms. At the same time, the commanders indicted by the ICC will not be interested in any deal that fails to protect them from ICC prosecution and fails to guarantee their personal safety.[10]

If the warrants of arrest are withdrawn, the question remains: who shall be blamed? Interviewed in February, senior ICC official Phakiso Mochockoko said that "The situation in northern Uganda was referred to the ICC prosecutor ( Argentina lawyer Luis Moreno Ocampo) by the government of Uganda. And as a result of that, the ICC is obliged to exercise its mandate in accordance with the statute".[11] As such it seems that cracks in the Rome Statute would need to be found before any warrants of arrest could be withdrawn.

Under article 53 of the Rome Statute, the prosecutor has the discretion to stop prosecutions that no longer serve 'the interest of justice'. Article 53 can only be used to end, not suspend, a case. An option of last resort subject to serious constraints, it calls for the prosecutor to consider the 'interest of justice', not peace. This is in line with the ICC's stated purpose articulated in the statute's preamble, which is to end impunity and ensure prosecution of those most responsible for the gravest crimes. As such, any decision to stop a case prior to prosecution, except on the most compelling grounds, is contrary to the court's core principles.[12]

Therefore, if for some Ugandan people (including Kony and his senior commanders) the ICC is an obstacle towards peace, the way "to give peace a chance" as Machar says, is to leave any decision to put the prosecutions on hold to the Security Council, as provided by article 16 of the Rome Statute.

This article permits the Security Council to determine that an agreement would be in the interest of peace and to require the ICC by a chapter VII resolution to defer action for renewable one-year periods, thereby suspending and not halting prosecutions.[13]

The time limitation of one year placed on the Security Council by the Rome Statute was both a recognition that article 16 should not become a back door to impunity, and a realization that the threat of not renewing a deferral gives the Security Council a tool for ensuring compliance with an agreement. Thus, even if the Council does intervene, the LRA may not be satisfied.[14]

But the Crisis Group argues that in theory, the Security Council could give de facto amnesty by promising to renew the yearly deferrals for the lives of the indicted, though such a pledge should at least be accompanied by a clear understanding that any violations by the LRA would mean a resumption of prosecutions.[15]

Article 16 of the Rome Statute does not provide any limit in terms of how many times the Security Council should renew a deferral action. This omission is a threat for the ICC as an anti impunity symbol. And any unlimited renewal one-year period in LRA leaders' case will set a precedent for the future ICC case and for international justice.

The Blanket Amnesty

Tina Rosenberg argues that a country's decisions about how to deal with its past should depend on many things: the type of dictatorship or war endured, the type of crimes committed, the level of societal complicity, the national political culture and history, the conditions necessary for dictatorship to occur, the abruptness of the transition, and the new democratic government's power and resources. She added that different countries have chosen widely different strategies to deal with the past.[16]

Among these strategies, is the granting of amnesty. This strategy is used by different countries in order to end conflict or dictatorship regimes. Samuel P. Huntington [17] distinguishes three types of democratization transitions: transformations, replacements and transplacements.

In transformations, those in power in the authoritarian regime take the lead and play the decisive role in ending that regime and changing it into a democratic system. In replacements however, democratization results from the opposition gaining strength and the government losing strength until the government collapses or is overthrown. In transplacements, democratization is produced by the combined actions of government and opposition.

In recent past, many dictatorship regimes used the amnesty strategy during transition to democracy to grant themselves a blanket amnesty such as in Chile with the Pinochet regime.[18] Others used the National Conference Forum such as in Togo with the Etienne Gnassingbé Eyadéma regime [19] , and in the DRC (former Zaire) with the Mobutu regime.[20]

However, in transplacements, the granting of amnesty has also been chosen in many countries. This amnesty could be a broader one, such in Sierra Leone [21] or conditional such as in South Africa.[22]

Thus in order to end a war conflict or a dictatorship and to establish a real democracy, many countries have chosen to grant a amnesty. Uganda is among them.

Indeed, the Ugandan president Yoweri Museveni has offered a blanket amnesty to LRA leaders in order the end the over 19 year long deadly civil war in his country. As noticed the BBC News: "Mr. Museveni clearly feels that for now, the most important thing to achieve is peace. And, in the interest of that peace, the widespread crimes of Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army should be put to one side."[23]

The ICC at The Hague may disagree. The court was founded on the basis that there can be no durable peace without justice, which to some extent satisfies victims that wrong have been addressed.[24]

At a 2002 meeting to mark the fourth anniversary of the adoption of the Rome Statute, Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nation, said "The date of 17 July 1998 will long be remembered as the world finally united to bring an end to the culture of impunity".[25] But challenging impunity does not only mean ferreting out former dictators from wherever they may be hiding in order to have them stand trial for the crimes they committed. It also means not extending amnesties to people accused of committing crimes against humanity.[26]

However, this point of view is not shared by all Ugandan people. Indeed, as noted IRIN, Ugandans are "...tired of war, most people want the rebels forgiven". According to them, maintaining a tough stance against the rebels and fighting them has only prolonged their suffering. "We are in a mood of forgiveness. Let the International Criminal Court not spoil our party preparations", some Ugandans have said.[27]

The ICC's aim to close "the gap of impunity" is felt by some Ugandan people to be a threat to the peace in Uganda. Some of them do not hesitate to criticize the presence of the ICC in the Uganda peace process. An internally displaced person, Nikson Owinyi, told Jan Egeland that "The international community should tell the ICC that the Acholi people don't like ICC in these affairs because it is holding back the peace process."[28]

Again Peter Onega, has claimed that the decision by the international court has left their work in "total confusion". He stated further, that "the statute establishing the ICC overrides the national laws and the court may decide to issue other warrants of arrest for people they have even issued amnesty to. .....The warrant would scare away willing rebels and frustrate the commission's effort to negotiate for ex-rebels return", he added.[29]

Indeed, in a bid to bring about a cessation of violence, the UAC was set up to offer a blanket amnesty to militia and soldiers. It was hoped that this amnesty would encourage them to lay down their weapons without fear of reprisal. Then in October, 2005, the ICC issued warrants of arrest against five members of the LRA in Uganda and this move effectively undid the work of the UAC.[30]

But Luis Moreno Ocampo, the Chief Prosecutor for the ICC, made himself clear on this issue when he told IRIN, "Domestic amnesties are strictly a matter for national authorities and do not act as bar to an investigation by the ICC". Thus, the message was that at a national level, amnesties may be granted, but they will not be guaranteed at an international level.[31]

The rejection of amnesty for perpetrators of human rights abuses on the basis that such amnesties are incompatible with the principle of international law has been steadily involving the whole world. The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia observed in 1998 that amnesties covering certain crimes' "would not be accorded international legal recognition" despite having legal force in that country. Spanish and French courts have also lent their backing to this interpretation, and the inter-American court of Human Rights in 2001 stated "All amnesty provisions are inadmissible, because they are intended to prevent the investigation and punishment of those responsible for serious human rights violations, which are non-derogable rights recognized by international human rights law."[32]

The UN holds the understanding that the amnesty provisions of the agreement shall not apply to the "international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes and other serious violations of international humanitarian law."[33]

Indeed, the amnesty issue facing the ICC in the Ugandan peace process is an opportunity for the international justice system to show the international community as a whole that the impunity gap is closed.

Far from spoiling the peace process in Uganda, the ICC could boost it. Its deterrent effect is one of the main explanations for the sudden willingness for the LRA leaders to negotiate. They no longer have anywhere to hide. They have lost support - the southern Sudan is no longer a threat for the government of Khartoum, and they are wanted in DRC by the MONUC, the UN mission in DRC after killing eight Guatemalan peacekeepers in Eastern DRC.[34]

Often, people like Kony and other LRA leaders need to be backed against the wall before one can expect any agreement from them for a negotiated solution. Mobutu, the DRC former president accepted negotiations with Laurant Desiré Kabila, the other former DRC President, (then rebel leader) when almost Â¾ of the country was controlled by the rebel group in 1997 . 'The rebels Lords Resistance Army has called for the resumption of peace talks with the Ugandan government' noted IRIN.[35]

As noted by the Citizens for Global solutions (CGS), Kony is exactly the type of person for whom the ICC was created. [36] Therefore, the blanket amnesty through a peace agreement becomes the last chance for a way out.

The implications of the Ugandan peace process in the Ituri District

As has been said before, DRC is affected by a deadly war which has resulted in over three million deaths and widespread displacement. The killing and other atrocities committed against the population by the national army, foreigners armies, rebel groups, and militias raises the issue of accountability of the perpetrators and reparation for the victims.

But in the DRC, the national judicial system is in collapse. According to Human Rights Watch, the DRC's national justice system is in a state of disarray. It will likely take years to establish a functioning, independent, impartial and fair judiciary.[37] And the Commission Vérité Reconciliation (CVR) - the Congolese truth commission - established by the Pretoria Agreement with the mandate to address reparation has failed to do its work.[38]

Therefore, the ICC becomes the alternative for the thousands of victims wanting to see justice done by holding their perpetrator accountable and getting reparations owed to them.

Among the most affected by the war is the population of Ituri District in northeast DRC bordering with Uganda. This population expects prosecution of the likes of Combra Matata, leader of the Ituri Patriotic Resistence Front (FRPI), one of the active militia groups and responsible for several atrocities including rape, burning houses and killing.[39]

The Ituri people also expect prosecution of Kawa Mandro of PUSIC, an Ituri militia [40], Peter Karim of Front des nationalistes et Integrationnistes (FNI) and Mathieu Ngudjolo of Mouvement des Révolutionnaires Congolais (MRC) [41]. Already there is a concern among the population in Ituri after the government appointed two ex-militia leaders, Peter Karim (FNI) and Mathieu Ngudjolo (MRC) as colonels in the national army [42], in the name of peace.[43]

But for the victims of war in the DRC, especially in Ituri, 'peace' means positive peace, one in which justice is addressed, human rights are respected and people live without any fear (as opposed to a negative peace such as a ceasefire, which is negative because it stops the war but does not address other issues). [44] And this 'peace' has to be based on the concept of justice. There is no peace without justice. But this justice has to be taken into the transitional justice perspective.[45]

Indeed, transitional justice offers a deeper, richer and broader vision which seeks to confront perpetrators, address the need of victims and assists in the start of a process of reconciliation and transformation.[46] Therefore, the Uganda peace process is very important for the people of that country.

The ongoing peace process in Uganda is being followed with interest by both the victims and perpetrators in Ituri District. The success or failure of the ICC in the LRA leaders case will have many implications. Successful prosecution will create an expectation for several victims of similar atrocities in Ituri to see their own perpetrators held accountable for their crimes and to expect reparations. It will produce a deterrent effect to other militias who are still active in the same area. [47] Indeed, the arrest of Thomas Lubanga, one of the militia leaders in Ituri by the ICC in April this year produced a strong deterrent effect. "Many here in the East are afraid the court will come...we all now are thinking twice . We do not what this court can and will do", confessed Xavier Ciribanya, former rebel leader of the RCD-goma and suspected of a range of crimes against civilians in both Kivus and Ituri.[48] Therefore, the ICC remains key in ending the violence and the last hope for the victims to see their perpetrators prosecuted, and to receive reparation after the complete failure of the CVR to address the issue. [49]

But, on other hand, failure will encourage the culture of impunity in Ituri District.

Indeed, the three conditions raised in the Ugandan peace process can be used by the different perpetrators in Ituri: firstly the Mato Oput option will gives people like Combra Matata who still has weapons the opportunity to escape a real trial. Secondly, the withdrawal of the warrants of arrest will give future perpetrators the chance to claim the Ugandan ICC case as jurisprudence. Finally, the blanket amnesty will be an opportunity for those prosecutable in Ituri District to extend the content of the law adopted by the DRC National Assembly which gives the CVR the power to propose amnesty for acts of war, political crimes and crimes of opinion.[50]

Conclusion

The ongoing peace process in Uganda is critical for the Ugandan people. This peace process can finally end the 19 year long deadly war which deeply affected the northern Ugandan people. But at the same time, the peace process in Uganda is critical for the ICC which faces its first test as the symbol to impunity. Furthermore the Ugandan peace process has implications for the Ituri District.

As a symbol for the ending of impunity or the closing of the impunity gap, the ICC has to stand behind its warrants of arrests. Justice has to be done. Not only for the victims in northern Uganda, but for others, including the Ituri.

The ICC is established not only for Uganda and its future will depend on what decision it takes today in order to secure tomorrow in its fight against the impunity. 'Justice for today's crimes supplies the legal foundation needed to deter tomorrow's atrocities. Without justice, there is no peace'.[51]

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Darfur, Sudan (ICC)

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents - Situation in Darfur, Sudan

'No one to help them': Rape extends from Darfur into eastern Chad
Amnesty International / Human Rights Watch

"We heard the Janjawid decide to open fire on the mosque and so we decided to run out… They captured the women… The men were holding their throats and sitting on their bodies so they could not move, and they took off their clothes and then used them as women. More than one man would use one woman. I could hear the women crying for help, but there was no one to help them."
A woman speaking to Amnesty International about an attack on Djorlo, Chad, on 7 November 2006.

It is impossible to know how many women have been raped since the armed conflict began in Darfur in 2003. There have certainly been thousands.

The names of 250 women who had been raped, and harrowing information about their cases, were recorded by Amnesty International on a 10-day visit to just three refugee camps in Chad in 2004. Many of the women had been gang raped. There are 173 camps for displaced people in Darfur and 12 refugee camps in Chad.

Over 500 victims of rape were treated at 25 clinics of Médecins sans Frontières in Darfur between October 2004 and mid-February 2005. Most had been raped by members of Janjawid militias as they went about normal daily tasks outside the camp.

Recent months have seen a dramatic increase in the numbers of rapes as Darfur has been plunged into new fighting. In just one camp in Darfur, Kalma camp, the International Rescue Committee reported that rapes of women rose from under four to 200 a month during five weeks in July and August 2006.

Despite the presence of an African Union peacekeeping force (African Union Mission in Sudan, AMIS) and international awareness of what is happening in Darfur, in 2006 rapes and other violence against women and girls have increased, not diminished.

Women rarely report rapes, even to medical staff, and humanitarian organizations have had to pull out of many areas of Darfur. The number of women receiving medical treatment is thus probably only a fraction of those raped or subjected to other forms of sexual violence.

Rape and other forms of sexual violence by fighters are recognized as war crimes and crimes against humanity. The large-scale and often systematic rape of women is the most flagrant example of the violence suffered by women in Darfur. Over and over again Darfuris have expressed this as something out of the ordinary and horrific: "It didn’t happen in any previous war ever fought in Darfur".

At the beginning of the conflict, women would not talk about rape. "Women will not tell you easily if such a thing happens to them. In our culture, it is a shame, and women will hide this in their hearts so that the men do not hear about it", one woman refugee in Chad told Amnesty International in 2003.

Only in the second year of the killings and mass forced displacements, when thousands had been raped, when the children of rapes were being born, and when it was clear that rape could no longer be hidden, did women begin to talk.

Rape as a weapon of war
Rape and other forms of sexual violence in Darfur are not just a consequence of the conflict or of undisciplined troops. Rape is a weapon of war. Its aim is to humiliate, punish, control, instil fear, and to drive women and whole communities from their land. The circumstances in which rapes are committed and their increasing number suggest that rape is often used to terrorize populations, to threaten them, to forcibly displace them.

The vast majority of rapes, abductions, sexual enslavements and other forms of sexual violence have been committed by the government-supported Janjawid militias.

"Suddenly the Janjawid attacked us… The majority [of the girls] managed to escape; me, my cousin and my sister were captured… One of them forced me on the ground and all the time I was resisting them…all the time one of the Janjawid kept his gun pointed at my head… Four of them raped me."
A 16-year-old girl describes an attack to Human Rights Watch, February 2005.

The Sudanese Janjawid have now taken their brutal attacks on civilians across the border into neighbouring Chad. In alliance with armed elements from certain ethnic groups in Chad, their aim appears to be to empty the areas bordering Sudan of a diverse range of ethnic groups who identify themselves and are identified by others as "African" rather than "Arab." They are again raping women as part of this process.

"It was the 8th day of Ramadan [30 September 2006] and eight of us – we are all about the same age between 15 and 16 – were looking for firewood… We then came across three men on horseback wearing jellabiyas... They pointed their guns at us and insulted us, calling us Nawab [plural of Nuba or "Africans", used as an insult] and telling us that the land did not belong to us. They also hit us with their horse whips and ends of their rifles. They then took one of the girls, and one held her by her arms and one by her legs and one raped her, they took turns… Only four of the girls were raped."
A Dajo girl speaking to Amnesty International in Chad, November 2006.

Members of the armed forces, police and reserve police have also committed rape.
"They wore army uniforms and one had a Kalashnikov… They whipped me with two whips, used by three men… I said nothing, I could not scream. I was raped by all five. I did not report the rape because they were government soldiers."
A woman interviewed by Human Rights Watch in North Darfur, July 2004.

Increasing numbers of rapes, by displaced men of displaced women, are reported within the camps for the internally displaced, where hundreds of thousands of Darfuris are often effectively imprisoned by Janjawid militias. Many of those who live or work in the camps say that there is more domestic violence too, by husbands and family members.

There are far fewer reports of rape involving armed opposition groups. However, a number of rapes by members of the Minni Minawi faction of the Sudan Liberation Army – one of the signatories of the Darfur Peace Agreement in May and now operating alongside government forces – were reported in the Tawila area in April 2006 and at the time of attacks and killings in Korma on 5 and 6 July 2006.

Sexual enslavement and attacks near the camps
Some women are kept in sexual slavery. One woman from Darfur described what happened to her when her village was attacked. She had a baby in her arms and said she was two months pregnant when she was raped.

"I was taken away by attackers in khaki and civilian clothes along with dozens of other girls and had to walk for three hours. During the day, we were beaten… We were taken to a place in the bush where we were raped several times at night. For three days, we did not receive food and almost no water. We were surrounded by armed guards. After three days, the Janjawid had to move to another place and set us free."
A woman from Darfur, interviewed by Amnesty International in Chad, 2004.

Such abductions continue in 2006. On 7 October 2006, during an attack on Djimeze Djarma in Chad, a group of women were captured by Janjawid and held for 20 days.

"The men made us cook, fetch water, feed their camels and horses, and cook food for them. They would move between us and if we disobeyed they would beat us with their whips. We suffered a lot. I thought that I would be killed."
A woman interviewed by Amnesty International in Chad, November 2006.

Most of the internally displaced, especially in West Darfur, are virtual prisoners in the camps. The Janjawid occupy the land and those who venture out of the camps face the threat of being killed, beaten or raped. These terror tactics ensure that vast swathes of territory are kept empty of targeted ethnic groups who will not dare to return to their land. Gathering firewood and fetching water are traditionally women’s work, but women who leave the camps for these necessities of life risk rape in 2006 as in 2004.

"In Garsila the women wanted to bring firewood and water, and many were raped by Janjawid."
A man from Garsila district, Darfur, interviewed in 2004.

Impunity for the rapists
Those who rape benefit from almost total impunity. AMIS forces have often tried to protect women, for instance by carrying out firewood patrols, but they lack sufficient numbers of troops. When a woman is raped, they tend to take no action.

"The AU [AMIS] is not interested in the displaced… When girls are raped in the neighbourhood of the camp, the AU’s only action is to bring the girl back to the camp. They do not carry out any investigation into the event".
A Masalit woman from Darfur, speaking to Amnesty International in Chad, 2006.

The police are deeply distrusted, particularly by those who have been raped.

"I cannot complain to the police, they will punish me even more, some Janjawid are in the police and some policemen themselves are Janjawid."
A girl who had been raped, talking in a North Darfur camp for the displaced in 2004.

The police frequently fail to take action to protect civilians under attack. In one case villagers sought shelter at a police station. The police reportedly stood by while Janjawid raped women, and shot and tortured men from their community who tried to protect them.
"They took girls away for long hours and brought them back later. Girls were crying, we knew they raped them. Some of us were raped in front of the crowd… I resisted them… They hit me and decided to rape me in front of others… Some young men tried to protect us…they received shots in both their legs… Others were hanged on the tree naked."
A Fur woman from South Darfur, interviewed by Human Rights Watch, February 2005.

The trauma and the stigma
The perpetrators of rape know very well the effect rape will have on a woman – not only the personal, psychological consequences, but that a married woman might be divorced, an unmarried woman never find a husband.

"Then two of the men raped me… I have not told anyone what happened to me… I do not know how my husband would react if he were to know. Men are different and some get angry with the woman."
A displaced woman near Goz Beida in Chad, speaking to Amnesty International, November 2006.

Even when families arrange a marriage for a daughter who has been raped, the victim remains traumatized and the social stigma can devastate the family.

"My daughter screams at night… I never talk to her about what happened, although she knows that I know what happened to her… Her father became very ill since that time. He never goes out with the rest of the men and he does nothing but staying inside the room… Now my daughter is married to her cousin, but where is he? He does not communicate with her or with us."
The mother of a 16-year-old girl, interviewed by Human Rights Watch, South Darfur, February 2005.

Rape can in some circumstances result in death or lasting injury. Female genital mutilation by infibulation, which occurs among some groups in Darfur and eastern Chad, can increase the severity of injuries incurred during rape, and can contribute to, for example, severe blood loss.

"They beat us and told us that you blacks are not going to stay here, we will finish you all. They then grabbed my half-sister who was only 10 years old… I saw two of them lie with my half-sister and then they went away. When we got there she was very hurt and was bleeding. She continued to bleed for the following two days and then died."
A displaced woman describing an attack by uniformed men near Goz Beida in Chad to Amnesty International, November 2006.

The dilemmas facing women who become pregnant as a result of rape are great. Some leave their families to hide their shame. Others are rejected by their family and give up the child for adoption. Others again stay and raise the child.

"A raped girl comes back to her family, and eventually delivers the baby and raises the child, as infanticide would be haram [forbidden]"
A refugee from Darfur in Chad, interviewed in 2006.

The UN Secretary-General said in March 2005 that he was "very concerned by the disturbing reports of arrests by the police of unmarried women in the Mukjar area ( West Darfur) who have become pregnant as a result of rape." Pregnant unmarried women in Sudan have frequently been charged with adultery and face a flogging if convicted. Adultery is a capital crime for a married woman under the 1991 Penal Code.

Surviving
When Amnesty International delegates tried to discuss the extent of the problem of rape in Darfur with the Sudanese government in 2004, every member of the government they met said that rape could not happen in Sudan. In July 2004 the government set up Rape Committees, composed of a woman judge, prosecutor and policewoman, which travelled to each Darfur State. But women said they did not trust the Committees, which reported that they had found only isolated rape cases.

An overstretched community of humanitarian workers and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) has difficulty in providing medical services or counselling to most of those who suffer rape or sexual violence. However, some humanitarian agencies and Sudanese NGOs are working with raped women from the camps in particular, and some women from the camps in Darfur are also counselling and helping women. One woman in a displaced camp in South Darfur who was raped in front of her husband – who was killed when he tried to protect her – overcame her grief and anger, and committed herself to provide support to other women who had survived violence.

Time to protect the women of Darfur and Chad The horrific pattern of sexual and other violence against women which has emerged from Darfur is by no means unique. In recent years, hundreds of thousands of women affected by conflict around the world have suffered the same fate.

Violence against women, as defined in international standards, is prohibited at all times, in all its forms, by international and regional treaties, as well as by customary international law. Even in times of armed conflict, women and girls have the right to be free from crimes which constitute violence against women.

Today, there can no longer be any excuse for ignoring the scale of crimes against women in conflict. With almost daily news reports from war zones across the globe, no one can claim that they do not know what is happening. No one can hide behind the excuse that nothing can be done. There is an urgent need to find more effective forms of action proportionate to the scale and gravity of the crimes that are unfolding.

Departing UN official: Darfur situation in `free fall'
Associated Press via Chicago Tribune
by Edith M. Lederer
December 6, 2006

NEW YORK -- The conflict in Darfur has spread to two neighboring countries and is now in a "free fall" with 6 million people facing the prospect of going without food or protection, the departing UN humanitarian chief said Tuesday.

Jan Egeland, who steps down Dec. 12, said in an interview that one of the biggest problems he faced was convincing countries of the dire situation in the western region of Sudan.

"I think some of the Arab countries and Asian countries have not really understood we're in a free fall. It's not a steady deterioration. It's a free fall and it includes Darfur, eastern Chad, northern Central African Republic," he said.

Egeland blamed the Sudanese government, parts of the rebel movement, ethnic leaders in Darfur and the government of Chad for fueling the war, which began in 2003 when rebels from ethnic African tribes rose up against the Arab-led central government. The government in Khartoum, Sudan, is accused of retaliating by unleashing the janjaweed militias of Arab nomads, who are accused of the worst atrocities.

The UN is evacuating its international staff and the assets it can because of the intensifying violence and insecurity, "but we're not protecting the lives of the vulnerable women and children, and there are four times more of them now than when we started in 2004," he said.

Egeland, who was the first to call Darfur the world's worst humanitarian emergency in November 2003, said one of his great regrets is that global leaders did not come together and offer the sticks and carrots to settle the conflict in 2004 when it involved 1 million people.

In a farewell speech Monday to the UN Security Council, Egeland accused world leaders of failing to live up to a pledge made at a UN summit in September 2005 to protect civilians caught in armed conflict from genocide, war crimes and ethnic cleansing. A Security Council resolution adopted in April reaffirmed their agreement.

In late November, Secretary General Kofi Annan said Sudan agreed in principle to a compromise "hybrid mission" from the African Union and the UN, but that Khartoum wanted to discuss the size, the force commander and the head of the overall mission.

"At the moment I think it's more than sad to see that grown men with jackets and ties like me sit and quarrel [over] what is a `hybrid force' ... while women and children are dying," Egeland said.

"I'm happy to note that in nine months we might have this force, but what about the next nine days where it could collapse completely?"

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Uganda (ICC)

Official Website of the International Criminal Court
ICC Public Documents - Situation in Uganda

ICC wants update on Kony case
New Vision
by Henry Mukasa
December 3, 2006

THE International Criminal Court (ICC) has ordered a review of the effects of the peace talks on the LRA indictments.

The presiding judge, Mauro Politi, issued an order from the court headquarters in The Hague on November 30, directing the prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo, to update him on the commitment of Uganda, the Democratic Republic of Congo and Sudan in executing the warrants of arrest against five LRA commanders.

“The chamber hereby requests the prosecutor to provide information on or before Friday 8th December whether and to what extent their statements concerning the continued commitment to executing the warrants of arrest are supported by concrete action and reflect their genuine willingness to cooperate,” the order read.

Moreno is requested to investigate in particular whether the peace negotiations and recent events in the region have affected the level of cooperation by the relevant governments.
The judge also wants to know if there are specific requests for assistance addressed to MONUC or the UN for the purpose of supporting the execution of the warrants.

Peace talks between the government and the LRA, mediated by the Government of Southern Sudan, are in suspense since the LRA delegation walked out last week, citing violations by UPDF.

LRA leader Joseph Kony and his deputy, Vincent Otti, demand that the warrants of arrest against them be withdrawn as a pre-condition for any peace settlement.

Why mato oput system should come before ICC
New Vision (Kampala)
by Fabius Okumu-Alya
December 4, 2006

THERE have been some concerns about mato oput, the Acholi traditional mechanism of conflict resolution, as opposed to prosecution of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) commanders by the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague. The issue here is between peace and justice: which one should prevail first? Secondly, whose justice are we talking about?

The ICC is representing the western concept of justice, while mato oput is representing the traditional concept of justice and reconciliation. These are two divergent conceptions, which should be merged in the interest of peace and justice in northern Uganda.

If you go by international standards, and look at the United Nations Charter of 1945, you will find that after realising the horrendous effects of the Second World War (1939-1945), they (UN founding fathers) came up with the preamble which talks about peace first, then justice comes later.

That is why, more than 60 years now, the Nazis are still being tried in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which is different from ICC although both are based in The Hague, Netherlands. So I look at peace as having been the priority of the United Nations founding fathers.
If you use that parameter, and then translate it locally, then it appears to me that the people’s aspiration (in northern Uganda) is peace first. And that peace should be got within their needs and wishes. The justice should be done in relation to the maintenance or sustenance of the peace.

For instance, if you bring the ICC, they will prosecute the suspects (Kony and his commanders) in The Hague and maybe imprison them for life. The life imprisonment should be interpreted to mean maybe 20 years. So after 20 years, taking the age of Kony (45), he will not be too old by the time he finishes his sentence. How will he fit into the community when he comes back to resettle in northern Uganda? Will that prosecution have resolved the conflict? That is why there is that preference that, locally, we should aim for peace first, then justice will follow on case by case basis.

After mato oput, these people (LRA leaders) can still be arrested. The Acholi are not saying we don’t want Kony to be prosecuted. They are not supporting impunity. But what they want is prioritization: which one should come first – the ICC or mato oput?

At international level, they say ‘there is no peace without justice, and there is no justice without peace’, an argument that is a bit ridiculous to me as an international lawyer. At least there is one of the two which comes first. If you go by what I have told you in the UN Charter of 1945, peace is first. Justice is continuous. Anytime LRA leaders can be prosecuted, because a crime never abets.
Since this is the clamour of the people of northern Uganda, who are themselves the victims, why don’t we respect their views?

The ICC seems to be a consistent intrusion into these traditional views. And sometimes people also make unnecessary sentiments, that ‘you see, the Acholi traditional system of justice is primitive’. What is the parameter for judging civilisation? civilisation in whose eyes? And for whose benefit?

For the people of northern Uganda, they are saying ‘this (mato oput) is our preferred system of justice and reconciliation.’ Why don’t people give it a try first before the ICC comes in? After all, the rebel leaders can still be brought to justice at a later date, probably after the most desired peace has been attained in northern Uganda.

Time up for war criminals
Sunday Vision
by Felix Osike
December 4, 2006

Last week the Government tabled the International Criminal Court Bill in Parliament. With top LRA commanders indicted by the ICC, Felix Osike examines the implications of the Bill...

Time for war criminals is running out in Uganda. The International Criminal Court Bill 2006, tabled in Parliament on Tuesday by the Minister of Justice, Dr. Khiddu Makubuya, sets out how to deal with such offenders.

If passed into law, people alleged to have committed war crimes can be arrested and surrendered to the Hague-based International Criminal Court (ICC).

But the timing of the Bill may be misinterpreted to mean going against the spirit of the Juba peace talks between the Government and the Lord’s Resistance Army rebels.

Former minister and legal expert Owinyi Dollo said Uganda was in a Catch-22 situation, where it has to proceed with the talks, but at the same time show commitment to the world court. “The Bill is an expression of Uganda’s proof of commitment for all perpetrators of war crimes to account for their crimes. But because of the Juba peace talks, it will be mis-interpreted by many people,” he said.

Dollo, however, said that enacting the law would strengthen Uganda’s negotiating power with the ICC incase it requested for the charges against the LRA to be dropped.

“Tabling the Bill is not for the purposes of ICC indictment. We are trying to domesticate the Rome Statute in the laws of Uganda,” said Fred Ruhindi, the Deputy Attorney General.

On the timing, Ruhindi said, “There should not be a misconception because this is a formality. We are including the Rome Statute, which is already in force, in our statute books.”

The Bill also deals with facilitating the appearances of witnesses and search and seizure of property.

The court can also give a freezing order prohibiting the suspects from dealing in a specified property that has relevance to the case. The Bill has provisions for punishment of the individual who commits genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. These include; identification, tracing and freezing or seizure of proceeds, property and assets of the criminals.

The Lord’s Resistance Army chief, Joseph Kony, is a target for trial at the Hague on 33 counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes committed since July 2002, when the ICC Rome Statute came into effect. His four top commanders face similar charges.

This has become a sticking point in the peace negotiations in Juba. The LRA rebels demand that the charges be dropped before they sign a comprehensive peace agreement.

Under the Bill, Uganda is obliged to co-operate with the ICC in hunting down, investigating and subsequent prosecution of persons accused of having committed the listed offences. It provides for the arrest and surrender to the ICC of the war criminals. The law will also empower Ugandan courts to try, convict and sentence such criminals and enforce penalties and ICC orders. Besides, the law will allow the ICC to conduct proceedings in Uganda.

Section 67 of the Bill also provides that non-Ugandan prisoners sentenced by the ICC can serve their sentences in Uganda if approved by the relevant authorities. On arrival in Uganda the prisoner shall be detained in accordance with Ugandan laws, but he or she may have a right to communicate on a confidential basis with the ICC.

On July 17, 1998, a conference of 160 countries across the world decided to set up the ICC under a document called the Rome Statute. Uganda joined the court in June 2002.

In December 2003, Uganda asked the ICC prosecutor to look into the conflict in northern Uganda. In July 2004, the ICC prosecutor announced there was reasonable basis to carry out the investigation.

Under the law, a police officer is authorised to search and seize property relating to the request from the ICC. The police officer can also stop and search any vehicle in which the item specified in the warrant is located or held at anytime.

The Bill also provides for the discretion of the ICC to refer any matter to the UN Security Council.

The Bill has a strict penalty for the judges handling ICC cases. It says a judge in Uganda or elsewhere who corruptly obtains or attempts to obtain a bribe for himself or herself to do or omit an act is liable on conviction or indictment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.

Bribing such judges can earn one seven years imprisonment. Giving false or fabricated evidence before the ICC will also earn witnesses seven years’ imprisonment.

According to the Bill, proceedings for the offences like genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity shall not be instituted in any Uganda court without the consent of the Attorney General.

Uganda is also obliged to co-operate with the ICC in the identification and arrest of the wanted persons, taking evidence and reports, temporal transfer of witnesses, examination of places and sites, including exhumations and examinations of gravesites, protection of victims and witnesses. The ICC while sitting in Uganda can summon and question any person over any subject under investigation by the ICC.

The court can require any person to disclose any information within his or her knowledge relevant to any investigation by the ICC and can commit persons for contempt of its orders.

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International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY)

Official Website of the ICTY

Blagoje Simic's Appeal Partly Granted, Sentence Reduced to Fifteen Years
Press Release of the ICTY
November 28, 2006

In its judgment issued today, the Tribunal's Appeals Chamber reversed the finding of the Trial Chamber that Blagoje Simić participated in a joint criminal enterprise whose aim was persecution of non-Serbs in the Bosanski Šamac municipality in northern Bosnia.

On 17 October 2003, Simić, a local Bosnian Serb politician, was convicted and sentenced to 17 years' imprisonment by the Trial Chamber for persecutions of non-Serb civilians in the municipality of Bosanski Šamac between 17 April 1992 and 31 December 1993. The non-Serb civilians were detained and confined under inhumane conditions, lacking sufficient space, food or water and were subjected to torture including sexual assaults, the extraction of teeth and threat of execution.

The Appeals Chamber found that Simić was not informed that he was being accused of participating in a joint criminal enterprise until the Prosecution had finished presenting its case, which rendered the trial unfair.

The Appeals Chamber also reversed Simić's conviction for persecution due to cruel and inhumane treatment in the form of torture and beating.

However, the Appeals Chamber upheld Simić's conviction for aiding and abetting persecution in the form of the unlawful arrests and detention of non-Serb civilians, confinement of non-Serb prisoners in inhumane conditions, forced labour by Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims, and forced displacement of non-Serb civilians.

The Appeals Chamber reached these findings by majority, with Judges Shahabuddeen and Schomburg dissenting.

The Appeals Chamber found that the re-characterisation of the Simić's criminal conduct and quashing of his conviction for acts of torture and beating required an adjustment of his sentence, reducing it to fifteen years. Judge Liu dissented from this decision.

The full text of the summary of the judgment can be found at the following link:
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p1130e-summary.htm

Stanislav Galic Sentenced to Life Imprisonment by Appeals Chamber for Crime Committed During the Siege of Sarajevo
Press Release of the ICTY
November 30, 2006

The Tribunal's Appeals Chamber today sentenced Stanislav Galić, a former Bosnian Serb Army commander, to life imprisonment for his role in the campaign of sniping and shelling against civilians in Sarajevo from September 1992 to August 1994. This is the first time the maximum penalty has been rendered by the Tribunal's Appeals Chamber.

The Appeals Chamber dismissed all 19 grounds of appeal by Galić, including those which claimed that Trial Chamber wrongly convicted him of the "acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which was to spread terror among the civilian population" of Sarajevo. The Appeals Chamber allowed the appeal by the Prosecution on the length of sentence, quashing the Trial Chamber sentence of 20 years.

The Appeals Chamber noted that the Trial Chamber relied on a plethora of evidence to demonstrate that terrorisation of the civilian population was the primary purpose of the campaign of sniping and shelling and that Galić, who held the position of commander of the Bosnian Serb Army Sarajevo-Romanija Corps (SRK), had the intent to spread terror among the civilian population.

In the findings upheld by the Appeals Chamber, the Trial Chamber established that the evidence demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that Sarajevo civilians were indeed made the object of deliberate attack by SRK forces. They were attacked while attending funerals, while in ambulances, trams, and buses, and while cycling. They were attacked while tending gardens, or shopping in markets, or clearing rubbish in the city. Children were targeted while playing or walking in the streets. These attacks were mostly carried out in daylight. They were not in response to any military threat. The attackers could for the most part easily tell that their victims were engaged in everyday civilian activities.

The Appeals Chamber specifically addressed a number of incidents, including that of 5 February 1994 when a mortar shell exploded in the Markale market in downtown Sarajevo, killing some 60 people and injuring more than a hundred. The Appeals Chamber found that the Trial Chamber's finding that the mortar shell came from SRK positions was not one that no reasonable trier of fact could have made. However, it held that the Trial Chamber was "incorrect to find that the shell was deliberately aimed at the Markale market but that, in any case, this shelling incident was an example of shelling that deliberately targeted civilians."

With respect to the Prosecution's appeal on sentence, the Appeals Chamber found that, although the Trial Chamber did not err in its factual findings and correctly noted the principles governing sentencing, "the sentence of only 20 years was so unreasonable and plainly unjust, in that it underestimated the gravity of Galić's criminal conduct."

This decision on Galic's appeal was reached by a majority of judges with Judge Schomburg dissenting with respect to the customary law nature of the crime of acts or threats of violence the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population. The decision on the Prosecution's sentence appeal was also reached by a majority of Judges with Judge Pocar partially dissenting and Judge Meron dissenting. Judge Shahabuddeen appended a separate opinion on both issues.

The full text of the summary of the judgment can be found at the following link:
http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p1131e-summary.htm

Trio indicted over Vojno camp crimes
Balkan Investigative Reporting Network (BIRN)
December 6, 2006

The Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina has confirmed that three former HVO members are to be charged over the abuse and murder of camp inmates.

The Bosnian court has confirmed an indictment which charges three Bosnian Croats with crimes committed during the dispute between the Croat Defence Council (HVO) and Army of BiH in Herzegovina.

Marko "Maka" Radic, Dragan "Petarda" Sunjic and Damir "Zingi" Brekalo - whose first name used to be Emir - are charged that, as former members of Bijelopoljska bojna Second Brigade of HVO, they formed Vojno detention camp in Mostar municipality and took part the in abuse and murders of Bosniaks from July 1993 to March 1994.

The indictment claims that on June 29, 1993, the Bosnian army attacked Bijelo Polje and detained a few HVO members and some Croat civilians. Radic then ordered the arrest of Bosniaks who continued to live in the western part of then-divided Mostar, and their exchange for Croats.

"As most men were already detained or in war, the detainees were women, children and elderly," the indictment reads.

All of those who were detained were taken to the village of Vojno, six kilometres from Mostar, where a detention camp was formed.

The indictment charges Radic with command and personal responsibility for what took place. It is alleged that he ordered, committed and otherwise assisted in the physical, mental and sexual abuse of civilians.

Damir Brekalo is charged that in August 1993 he took part in the beating of detainees who were on forced labour on the Bijelo Polje front line, after which he killed them. Their bodies were exchanged and identified in April 1994.

Dragan Sunjic, who was deputy warden of Vojno detention camp, is also charged with personal and command responsibility. It is alleged that in August 1993 he had heavily beaten one detainee in Vojno camp jointly with Mario Mihailo, after which the detainee died. His body was exchanged and identified in January 1995.

Sunjic is also charged that in October 1993 jointly with other HVO soldiers he took part in the transfer of around 50 detainees from Heliodrom detention camp to Vojno town. Some of the detainees were killed half way there.

In Vojno camp, with whose operation Radic is charged, it is claimed that detainees were used as forced labour where they were abused in the most brutal of ways - including torture by electricity and beating with wooden bats and axe handles.

According to the indictment, Radic personally also took part in the abuse of women detainees in Vojno camp - including underage girls - and encouraged others to do the same thing, including the other two indictees.

In the explanation of the indictment it stands that there is evidence to prove that rape and sexual abuse took place intentionally and according to a plan. One alleged victim has claimed that of three months she spent in detention, only five days passed where she was not raped. Some of the girls who were allegedly underage victims of the three indictees are expected to appear as witnesses.

It is not known how many persons were detained in Vojno detention camp, which was closed on March 6, 1994.

The joint indictment against the three consists of 19 counts, all of which charge them with crimes against humanity. According to current law, indictees should enter a plea within 15 days from the day of confirmation of indictment.

Vojislav Seselj to Resume Taking Food
Press Release of the ICTY
December 8, 2006

Vojislav Šešelj has informed the Tribunal that he will resume taking foodstuffs and receive medical attention, ending his refusal since 11 November 2006 to do so.

The Tribunal's doctor commenced an examination of Šešelj in order to determine his condition and what immediate steps are required in order to safeguard his health.

Šešelj informed the Tribunal that his decision was made in view of the Appeals Chamber's decision issued today, as well as commitments from the Registry to facilitate many of his requests concerning arrangements for his defence. The Appeals Chamber's decision granted Šešelj's appeal against the Trial Chamber's decision to impose stand by counsel.

The Appeals Chamber ruled that all trial proceedings in this case following the order of the Trial Chamber directing the Registry to appoint standby counsel are set aside. The trial of Šešelj is suspended until such time as he is fit enough to fully participate in the proceeding as a self-represented accused.

In addressing Šešelj's appeal, the Appeals Chamber found that, while appreciating the efforts of the Trial Chamber to ensure the fair and expeditious conduct of this trial, the Trial Chamber abused its discretion by immediately ordering the imposition of standby counsel, without first establishing additional obstructionist behaviour on the part of Šešelj warranting that imposition. By so doing, the Trial Chamber failed to give Šešelj a real opportunity to show to the Trial Chamber that despite his conduct in pre-trial, and the conduct leading up to the imposition of assigned counsel, he now understood that in order to be permitted to conduct his defence, he would have to comply with the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Tribunal and that he was willing to do so. It was this opportunity that the Appeals Chamber Decision intended to accord to Šešelj.

The Appeals Chamber reversed the Impugned Decision assigning counsel to Šešelj and directed the Trial Chamber not to impose standby counsel unless Šešelj exhibits obstructionist behaviour fully satisfying the Trial Chamber that, in order to ensure a fair and expeditious trial, Šešelj requires the assistance of standby counsel. The Appeals Chamber ruled that, should a time come when the Trial Chamber felt justified in making such a decision, the Rule 44 list of Counsel should initially be provided to Šešelj and he should be permitted to select standby counsel from that list. The Appeals Chamber placed similar conditions of restraint on the exercise by the Trial Chamber of its discretion to impose assigned counsel in the future should Šešelj fail to abide by the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure and Evidence as a self-represented accused and behave in a way that persistently obstructs the proceedings.

Due to the current health condition of Šešelj, the Appeals Chamber ordered that his trial should not open until such time as he is fully able to participate in the proceeding as a self-represented accused.

The decision can be found at:
http://www.un.org/icty/seselj/appeal/decision-e/061208e.pdf

Dragan loses bid to prevent extradition hearing
AAP via The Sydney Morning Herald
December 8, 2006

Accused Croatian war criminal Dragan Vasiljkovic has lost a bid to prevent his extradition hearing going ahead.

Croatia is seeking Vasiljkovic over his alleged involvement in war crimes between 1991 and 1993.

Vasiljkovic, known to his supporters as Captain Dragan, is accused of killing civilians and instructing others to commit murder during his time as a commander of Serbian paramilitary forces.

He is also alleged to have fired upon a civilian city and kicked a person in the head causing brain bleeding.

In a Sydney magistrate's court today, Vasiljkovic's barrister Bradley Slowgrove failed in a bid to have the extradition hearing dismissed on legal grounds.

Mr Slowgrove argued that normal criminal laws which applied in Croatia and could be held as equivalent in Australia for extradition purposes did not apply in times of war.

"Because we are in war and armed conflict and outside the King's peace it might be lawful to kick somebody, it's not automatically unlawful," Mr Slowgrove told Central Local Court.

He also told Deputy Chief Magistrate Paul Cloran that prisoners of war were "dangerous" persons who required discipline by captors to prevent them from escaping, and there was insufficient evidence to show Vasiljkovic wasn't motivated by such circumstances.

Mr Slowgrove claimed it was also questionable whether the acts were so grave as to constitute a crime under the Geneva Convention.

"It's not every breach that creates criminal responsibility, not every act of physical violence is a breach under the convention," he said

"It's a matter of impression, there's not enough information alleged."

Mr Cloran rejected Mr Slowgrove's arguments and ordered the extradition hearing proceed.

"In my view the provisions of (the Extradition Act) have been fulfilled," he told the court.

Former prosecutor for the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, Grant Niemann, told the court that Vasiljkovic could be considered a protected person under the Geneva Convention, which could determine the events for which he could be punished, and the severity of the penalty.

The forces involved in and funding the conflict were also relevant considerations, Mr Niemann said.

In Vasiljkovic's case, the question of his military rank would be important in considering the question of command responsibility, he said.

Vasiljkovic has been in custody since January when the federal government acted on a provisional extradition request from Croatian authorities.

The 51-year-old had repeatedly denied committing war crimes.

He unsuccessfully challenged his detention in the High Court earlier this year, claiming he was being illegally held because no formal extradition treaty existed between Australia and Croatia.

The hearing continues on Monday.

Mass grave near Brčko contained 258 bodies
B-92
December 8, 2006

BRČKO -- Bosnian forensics exhumed 258 bodies of the victims from a mass grave discovered near the northern district of Brčko.

The Commission on Missing Persons’ Murat Hurtić said Friday that a total of 107 complete and 151 incomplete bodies were exhumed from the mass grave at Gorica location near Brčko.

The victims, he said, were believed to be Bosnian Muslims and Croats, executed after Bosnian Serb troops took control over the wider area of Brčko at the beginning of the 1992-1995 war in Bosnia- Herzegovina.

Already in the first stages of the war more than 500 non-Serb civilians from the Brčko area were killed in the town or in several Bosnian Serb detention camps in the town's vicinity.

Many wartime victims from Brčko remain unaccounted for.

Hurtić said the number of the exhumed victims from the Gorica mass grave was not final as the exhumation was to continue through the next week, with some 20 to 30 bodies expected to be found in the lower layers of the grave.

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International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)

Official Website of the ICTR

ICTR/Attack - the ICTR Had Aborted Investigation On the Attack Against Habyarimana's Plane
AllAfrica.com - Hirondelle News Agency (Lausanne)
November 29, 2006

Investigators working for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) have searched and gathered elements of information concerning the attack against the plane of the Rwandan President Juvénal Habiarimana but these inquiries have been interrupted, French judge Jean-Louis Bruguière has confirmed.

According to the magistrate whose investigation was recently released, these elements were gathered in February 1997 by ICTR investigators based in Kigali and working under the authority of Louise Harbour ( Canada) who was the prosecutor at that time. A report was communicated in March 2000 to the president of the tribunal, Mrs. Nawanethem Pillay. Several newspapers have made mention of this investigation since then.

Ten days after the release of the French investigation conducted at the request of the families of the plane crew, the current prosecutor of the ICTR - and in theory only prosecutor concerned by the case - has made no statement. The investigation has drawn heated reaction from the incriminated Rwandan authorities. The country has cut off its diplomatic relations with France.

The ICTR's aborted investigation has been led by an Australian magistrate, Mr. Michael Hourrigan who used to be a prosecutor in his country and now works as a lawyer in the United States. According to him, this investigation was interrupted after he had communicated its results to a person in charge of the Security at the United Nations. Mrs. Harbour had summoned him to The Hague and asked him to renounce all contacts with his informants on this issue and blamed him for having led an investigation external to the Tribunal's jurisdiction.

The issue of these limits to the ICTR's jurisdiction, even though the Tribunal has authority under the article 4 of its status to condemn any violation of the Geneva Accords such as terrorism, have been brought up by the spokesperson and deputy registrar of the international tribunal, Mr. Everard O'Donnell. When Bruguière's investigation was published last week, O'Donnell declared that the ICTR is not capacitated to investigate on this particular attack which concerned only « the assassination of one or several individuals ». On April 6th 1994, the Rwandan president Juvénal Habyarimana and his Burundese counterpart died in the attack against the plane they were traveling in. The plane was shot down by a ground-to-air missile as it neared the airport of Kigali.

Several attorneys, whose association O'Donnell has severely criticized, consider since then that the registrar has lost all neutrality. Some of them note that his statement was made during a press conference the Rwandan delegate at the ICTR was attending.

Talking anonymously, several magistrates working at the ICTR call these debates on the extent of the tribunal's jurisdiction « specious ». They talk about the culpability of the United Nations and its secretary general in the face of the Rwandan genocide and how in turn the government in place at the time « made hostage » the ICTR. As proof of this, one of the anonymous magistrates has highlighted that the first judgments of the ICTR for the year 2001 had made mention of a « plane gunned down » whereas the latest judgments refer to a plane which has « fallen down »

Alleged witness tells radio French judge doctored report
The New Times
December 2, 2006

Text of report by Ignatus Ssuuna entitled "Witness disowns Bruguiere's report" published by Rwandan newspaper The New Times website on 1 December; subheading inserted editorially

Kigali : Emmanuel Ruzigana, a "witness" French magistrate Jean-Louis Bruguiere quotes in his 64-page report in which he claims that the Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army downed Juvenal Habyarimana's plane, has said the report was doctored.

Ruzigana, a former Rwandan Defense Forces (RDF) member wrote to Bruguiere on Thursday, expressing outrage after seeing his name on the Report's page 23 and 25, alleging he was a key source.

Witness ready to tell international court truth

In the two pages, Bruguiere claims Ruzigana belonged to a RPF''s "Network Commando" and that he knows who downed the plane. But speaking on phone from Norway where he now lives, Ruzigana dismissed the Report as baseless and highly inaccurate and said he is ready to travel to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in Arusha, Tanzania to set the record straight. "At no time did I say the leadership of RPF/A shot down Habyarimana's Falcon executive presidential jet," Ruzigana, who was demobilized in 2004, said in an interview.

Ruzigana, who was speaking during a live-talk show on Contact FM on1 December, added that he decided to write a protest letter because the Bruguiere report portrayed him as a traitor. "I have decided to write this protest letter because I have never said that President Paul Kagame shot down Habyarimana's plane; that is a lie." Ruzigana said.

Witness did not see shooting down of plane

He said on his way to Europe, he made a stopover in Paris and was invited to see Bruguiere impromptu. Ruzigana said he only told Bruguiere that by the time Habyarimana's plane was destroyed he was not in Kigali and therefore, could not have seen the attackers. "I told him (Bruguiere) point blank that I was based in Umutara province and didn't see who shot down the plane," Rusigana explained. He added: "I think because I kept quiet following the demobilization, they thought I was disgruntled and therefore, a soft target in their machinations." And indeed, some researchers and other experts have cast doubt on the credibility of the magistrate's report, and many websites of some French newspapers have pointed out that the report was hushed and appears to have been written without an independent mind.

Consequently, Bruguiere's claims sparked off anger amongst Rwandans, prompting many in Kigali and other European cities to demonstrate against France for its role in the 1994 genocide and the subsequent political witch-hunt against the current leadership. Also, the claims led to the severing of ties between Rwanda and France. The 1994 genocide was one of the fastest and most well pre-planned mass killings of the twentieth century, in which an estimated one million people were murdered in the space of 100 days.

One Verdict, One Prisonner to Be Released
AllAfrica.com - Hirondelle News Agency
December 4, 2006

One convict at the end of his prison term to be released, one verdict and the conclusion of debates in a major trial: it is going to be an action-packed December at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in charge of conducting the most important trials of the alleged perpetrators of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda.

On December 6th and for the very first time in its history, the ICTR will free a prisoner who has completed his prison term. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, an 82 year old Adventist pastor, had been sentenced to ten years in prison on February 19th 2003.

The man, formerly at the head of the church of Mugonero (west), had been arrested for the first time in September 1996 in the United States and released and rearrested in February 1998.

The ICTR convicted him of genocide crimes and crimes against humanity. His son, Dr Gérard Ntakirutimana, who appeared alongside him before the court, is serving a twenty-five year sentence.

The ICTR has released prisoners before but either they have been acquitted or the prosecutor has dropped the charges against them.

The legal texts of the Tribunal say nothing of the status of released persons especially the question of host countries. Four persons the jurisdiction has acquitted, two years ago in some cases, are still in Arusha waiting for the outcome of the Registrar's tedious negotiations with some foreign governments.

Elizaphan Ntakirutimana's defence lawyer, Mr. Ramsay Clark (USA), was in Arusha at the end of November to discuss the conditions of his client's liberation with the registrar. Father Ntakirutimana's poor health is effectively causing further difficulties.

The other event expected in December is a verdict in the trial of the first Catholic priest to be tried by the ICTR, Father Athanase Seromba. The ruling is expected on December 13th.

Father Seromba, in charge of the parish of Nyange (west), is accused of having ordered the death of about 2.000 of his parishioners who had sheltered in his church in 1994.

He has pleaded not guilty. His trial began on September 20th 2004. The closing arguments were concluded on June, 28th 2006.

Conclusion of « Military I »

The verdict against Seromba, if confirmed, will coincide with the end of the debates in « Military I » which began on April 2nd 2002 and counts among the ICTR's major trials. It regroups four high-ranked officers of the former Rwandan Army, one of them a colonel accused of being « the mastermind of the 1994 genocide »

The prosecutor rested his case in October 2004. The defendants, who have been calling their defence witnesses since April 2005, have until December 13th to conclude their own. The closing arguments will follow in due course.

Other ongoing cases

These three major events aside, the Tribunal will continue the hearings in other ongoing trials. The trials on the ICTR's schedule for December are Butare (six defendants), open since June 2001, "Karemera and others" which has begun in September 2005 and the trial of another Catholic priest, Father Emmanuel Rukundo, which started on November 15th 2006.

On December 15th, all debates will be suspended for the duration of the judicial recess. Finally, the Tribunal will sit for a few days in « Military II » and in former Prefect Zigiranyirazo cases.

In Military II, it will be completing the hearing of General Roméo Dallaire ( Canada), the former commander of the UN forces in Rwanda and last witness for the prosecution in this trial. Military II started in September 2004 and involves four officers among whom two ex-chiefs of the General Staff (Army and Gendarmerie).

Notorious pastor convicted by UN tribunal over Rwandan genocide completes jail term
UN News Service
December 6, 2006

An elderly former pastor today became the first person convicted and jailed by the United Nations war crimes tribunal for the Rwandan genocide to be released after serving his sentence.

Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, 81, a former senior pastor of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church, was sentenced by the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) in February 2003 to 10 years’ imprisonment after being convicted of aiding and abetting the 1994 genocide in the central African country. He was also convicted of aiding and abetting extermination.

Mr. Ntakirutimana was given credit for the time spent in detention before his trial. He was arrested in the United States in September 1996, later released and re-arrested, before being transferred to the ICTR detention centre in Arusha, Tanzania, in March 2000.

At his trial, prosecutors told the ICTR how Mr. Ntakuritimana personally drove armed Hutu attackers to various places where Tutsis had taken refuge and also went to a church in the Bisesero area of western Rwanda in which he was pastor and ordered the removal of its roof so that Tutsis could no longer use it as a shelter.

Several witnesses testified that they believed Mr. Ntakuritimana would use his influence to protect them from attacks, and in April 1994 seven Tutsi pastors wrote a letter to him pleading for his intervention.

“We wish to inform you that we have heard that tomorrow we will be killed with our families,” the letter stated. But in his reply the pastor wrote “there is nothing I can do for you. All you can do is prepare to die, for your time has come.”

His son, Gérard, a medical doctor, was sentenced by the Tribunal to 25 years’ jail for related war crimes.

Some 800,000 Tutsis and moderate Hutus were murdered, mostly by machete, across Rwanda in just 100 days starting in April 1994. The Security Council set up the ICTR in November that year to prosecute people responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law.

French Premier Backed Genocide - Kagame
AllAfrica.com - The New Times (Kigali)
by James Munyaneza
December 7, 2006

President Paul Kagame has singled out the Prime Minister of France Dominique de Villepin as one of the French government officials who supported the 1994 Rwanda Genocide. Kagame, who was speaking on BBC's Hard Talk live show yesterday morning, said.

France took part in the planning and execution of the killings, which saw an estimated one million Rwandans killed in a record spell of 100 days. "The current French prime minister is among the French officials that supported the Genocide. The role of the French government in the killing of Rwandans is public knowledge," Kagame said in the interview with Stephen Sucker.

During the Genocide, de Villepin was the Director of Cabinet in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He becomes the first serving French official to be publicly implicated in the Genocide, which was stopped by the Rwanda Patriotic Front/Army (RPF/A). Kagame also lashed out at France and magistrate, Jean-Louis Bruguiere, for linking RPF to the April 6, 2006 shooting down of a plane carrying former Rwandan president Juvenal Habyarimana.

He said the allegations were intended to cover-up Paris' own involvement in the Genocide.

" France gave the then government of Rwanda money to commit Genocide. If he is credible, why doesn't he (Bruguiere) investigate the role of the French government and officials in the Genocide... Why fabricate stories?" asked Kagame.

"I am surprised that people are still asking this. There is documentary evidence. It is public knowledge that they (French) actively supported the Genocide," Kagame added.

Last month, Bruguiere published a 64-page report in which he claimed that the RPF/A brought down the Falcon Mystere 50 aircraft which killed Habyarimana and former Burundian president, Cyprian Ntiryamira.

The allegations sparked angry protests, with a series of anti-France demonstrations being held both within and outside the country. Also, the government severed ties with the European nation. "There is no evidence whatsoever for Rwandan leaders who stopped the Genocide to be tried and moreover by France which is implicated in the killings. They are wild allegations.

"The report is based on testimonies from people who are wanted by the ICTR for committing genocide crimes. These suspects cannot be accessed by the tribunal, but they are accessed by France," Kagame, who was on a working visit to Britain, said.

Burundi and Uganda have also publicly scoffed at the French allegations, with Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni describing France as 'an African problem which requires an immediate solution'.

Bruguiere's report has also suffered a serious blow with some of the 'witnesses' he quotes in the report, disassociating themselves from the information he attributed to them.

In a letter to the French Magistrate, one of the 'witnesses', Emmanuel Ruzigana, is quoted as writing: "I categorically refute all that was attributed to me. I am bitterly surprised to find that on page 23 of your document you wrongly attributed my association with Network Commando, a group whose existence I did not know.

In the same document ... you even went further to confirm lies that I knew who shot down the plane, yet I told you that I wasn't aware of such a thing'.

The president said Rwanda had absolute rights to sue the government of France based on findings of the ongoing Commission of Inquiry into the French role in the Genocide. The 'Mucyo Commission' is currently gathering evidence against the French government.

Analysts have accused Paris of relentlessly pursuing a 'colonial-like' foreign policy in its former African colonies and in countries where it gained considerable influence in the post-colonial era.

A French soldier at a road block pulls a would-be-victim out of a jeep as the Interahamwe militia and Ex-FAR come to his assistance.

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