Can We Solve the Kosovo Problem? Yes

By James R. Hooper, for The Dallas Morning News, Sunday, April 11, 1999

The war over Kosovo is about more than the fate of the people in the Balkans. What is at stake is the belief in American power, purpose and resolve in determining the values that post-Cold War Europe will abide by. If Serbia achieves its war objectives, the ethnic cleansers will set new ground rules for Europe. We can resolve the Kosovo conflict, but it is illusory to think that we can do it by diplomacy. The Serbs regard Kosovo as the birthplace of their culture and the touchstone of their national identity.

The Serbian national myth commemorates the defeat of the Serbian army by the Ottoman Turks at the battle of Kosovo in 1389, which ushered in centuries of Ottoman rule over Serbia. Defeat is far preferable - and more honorable - to Serbian dictator Slobodan Milosevic and his people than dishonorable surrender or compromise. The only agreement over Kosovo that Mr. Milosevic might sign is a thinly disguised NATO capitulation.

While the Serbs cherish the myth of Kosovo's importance, they refuse to reside there. More than 90 percent of the province's two million people are ethnic Albanians. Even a system of harsh repression instituted by Mr. Milosevic when he illegally ended Kosovo's autonomy in 1989 has failed to inspire sufficient confidence among Serbs to persuade them to move to Kosovo. Thus the political calculus behind ethnically cleansing the province: Kill or deport the Albanians as the prelude to repopulating Kosovo with Serbs. Mr. Milosevic has deliberately chosen the battlefield, rather than the negotiating table, as his arena of choice for resolving the Kosovo problem.

If NATO is to prevail - and now that it is engaged, NATO can and must win - that is where the work must be done. The United States and its allies must be prepared to use whatever means are necessary to defeat the Serbs, including ground troops. NATO air strikes alone can inflict significant damage. Only a combined air/ground campaign, however, can drive all Serbian forces from Kosovo and provide the security that will enable all Kosovar refugees to return to their homes and begin rebuilding their lives. But turning the tide of battle is going to require presidential leadership.

All eyes are on the White House, waiting to see when President Clinton will begin to capitalize on growing national support for using ground troops to defeat Serbian forces. Much of Washington's political establishment, including a growing number of senators who are concerned about the implications of a NATO defeat, has rallied behind the ground-troop option. Recent opinion polls show that more than 50 percent of the American people back the deployment of ground troops to end the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe caused by Serbian ethnic cleansing and genocide. This support would increase with the president's help. It would take about 100,000 troops, including perhaps two U.S. divisions, to drive Serbian forces from Kosovo.

During a buildup phase lasting several weeks, these troops would assemble in neighboring states, especially Macedonia and perhaps Albania. NATO might also sound out Montenegro, which is federated with Serbia but under threat of Serbian attack, about stationing troops there. Such a deployment of troops would ease local concerns about Serbian threats. It would also stabilize the refugee situation, giving these fragile societies the confidence to provide temporary shelter to refugees who would soon be returning home. Cooperation from Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro in providing bases for troops should be supplemented with a program to begin training and equipping the Kosovars.

Kosovo Liberation Army insurgents armed with little more than Kalashnikov rifles have fought bravely against Serbian armor and artillery. Properly armed and trained outside Kosovo, they could play a useful battlefield role as NATO auxiliaries. While the ground-force buildup was underway, NATO air power would continue to pound Serbian targets. Following the removal of all Serbian forces from Kosovo and the return of the refugees, NATO's political objective should be the establishment of self-government in Kosovo for a transition period of three years, with the option of seeking independence if democracy and stability take hold. NATO should avoid the pitfalls of attacking and occupying Serbia proper, where the population, unlike in Kosovo, would not welcome NATO troops. Establishing a de facto alliance with Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo itself would give the United States and NATO the foundation for a strategy against Mr. Milosevic that would isolate Serbia until the fires of ultranationalism burn low.

The Balkans have become the new front line for NATO in post-Cold War Europe. NATO troops will be stationed in Kosovo and elsewhere in a containment belt around Serbia for years, but most of the combat troops needed to defeat the Serbs in Kosovo can depart once the conflict ends. NATO will have new burdens and responsibilities, post-Cold War American leadership will have passed a crucial credibility test, and the Serbian threat in the region will be over.