Kosovo Policy Disaster Deepens

By James R. Hooper, for the Portland Oregonian, August 9, 1998

Once again, Balkan roads are choked with refugees driven from their homes and villages, seeking food, temporary shelter and security as their world collapses around them.

At least 260,000 refugees have been on the move in Kosovo since February, more than 10 percent of its population of 2 million (90 percent of whom are ethnic Albanians). Humanitarian relief workers belonging to the Mother Teresa Society have been arrested and reportedly abused in Serbian jails. Serbian snipers prevent farmers from bringing in their crops. Unharvested fields and orchards have been set aflame. When the snows arrive this year in Kosovo, the cold weather will wreak havoc on a people weakened by hunger, strife and prolonged suffering.

The United States is confronted with another defining moment in Europe by the latest Balkan war. Washington must either exercise resolute leadership to shape an outcome consistent with American democratic and humanitarian values and security interests, or remain inactive and watch our credibility erode as others conclude that the United States is not prepared to deal with the toughest post-Cold War security problems in Europe.

The outlook is not promising. Until late February, when Serbian strongman Slobodan Milosevic began his crackdown ostensibly against the Kosovo Liberation Army but in truth against the Kosovar Albanian people, peace had been maintained through the credibility of the so-called "Christmas warning." This message from President Bush, delivered to Milosevic on Christmas Day in 1992 and renewed by the Clinton administration when it took office, threatened U.S. military intervention if Serbia cracked down in Kosovo.

As the Serbian attack began, all eyes turned to Washington awaiting President Clinton's response. Nothing happened. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, assuring the international community that the United States had learned the lessons of Bosnia, found that the White House had rejected her advocacy of forceful intervention. Instead, she had to convene the six-nation Contact Group and settle for hollow economic sanctions against Serbia, a "least common denominator" approach that she had hoped to avoid.

Having gambled successfully that Washington would back down, Milosevic raised the ante against the Kosovar Albanians and NATO. Soon more than a dozen towns were being shelled by Serbian artillery and refugees were streaming into neighboring Albania, Macedonia and Montenegro. The United States and NATO held air exercises nearby and threatened air strikes to halt renewed "ethnic cleansing," only to buckle when their bluff was called again by Milosevic.

The advent of the war and absence of forceful intervention by NATO caused support for the Kosovo Liberation Army to balloon virtually overnight. Consisting of perhaps 200 fighters in February, by early August its size was estimated at 20,000 to 50,000. Intensified fighting drew fresh recruits to the KLA banner from within Kosovo and abroad. Loose talk within the army of a "Greater Albania" embracing ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, Albania, Montenegro and Macedonia (whose population is roughly one-third ethnic Albanian), however, transformed international perceptions of the KLA and gave Western leaders an alibi for further inaction. The specter of increased regional destabilization induced Western diplomats to signal Milosevic in late July that defeat on the battlefield would hasten the army's appearance at the negotiating table.

What action should Washington take in the crisis? The foundation for successful policy must be the realization that Milosevic is the primary cause of regional instability. He is fundamentally opposed to U.S. leadership in Europe and the vitality of the NATO alliance, both of which will be vulnerable until he is brought to account. That means linking American and NATO air power to diplomacy, enabling diplomats and humanitarian assistance organizations to get on with their urgent tasks.

It also means acknowledging that Milosevic, by his brutal excesses, has forfeited Serbia's right of sovereignty over Kosovo. The international community should apply the concept of "earned independence" to Kosovo. Kosovo would become a ward of the international community for five years, during which time it would be self-governing but not independent, and would have to demonstrate by responsible behavior -- its treatment of Serbian minorities, avoiding destabilization of neighboring states -- that it was ready for independence and international recognition.

The Balkans continue to be a litmus test for American foreign policy. A thinly-disguised surrender to Milosevic in Kosovo will only compound our problems in Europe. Diplomacy backed by force offers the best option for preserving America's humanitarian values and security interests.

James R. Hooper, who served for more than 25 years in the U.S. Foreign Service, is executive director of the Balkan Action Council, an independent Washington-based nonprofit organization. He will speak on Kosovo for the Monthly Headline Forum of the World Affairs Council at noon Thursday in the University Club, 1225 S.W. Sixth Ave.