The West Must Act to Avoid a Bosnia Redux

By Norman Cigar and Paul Williams, for the Wall Street Journal-Europe, Thursday, March 26, 1998

Belgrade's continuing violent crackdown in the Kosovo region of Yugoslavia is testing whether the international community has learned any lessons from the experience in Bosnia. Yesterday's failure by the Contact Group -- an association of concerned countries including the U.S., United Kingdom, France, Germany, Russia and Italy -- to agree upon a comprehensive set of sanctions to apply against Belgrade suggests that the West's learning curve is a bit flat.

The intent of Yugoslavia's President Slobodan Milosevic is clear enough. He wants to hold on to Kosovo, but does not want the province's 90% ethnic Albanian majority to have a say on how the province is run. From Belgrade's perspective, the real problem is that within a generation in the Serbian region itself, non-Serbs will outnumber Serbs, who have an aging and declining population. Nationalist Serbian politicians have talked of using whatever means available to reduce the Albanian population.

For the past decade the Milosevic regime has been denying basic rights in and imposing an apartheid-like regime on Kosovo in the hope that Kosovars would leave on their own accord -- a reported 400,000 have already done so. Nonetheless, for the past 10 years, Kosovar Albanian leader Ibrahim Rugova has been urging ethnic Albanians to be patient and counter Serbian mistreatment with dialogue and nonviolent protests.

Mr. Rugova had hoped that these tactics would compel the international community to recognize Serb injustices and aid the Kosovars in obtaining a high degree of autonomy within Yugoslavia. It didn't happen. Now the Kosovo Albanians face a "Warsaw Ghetto dilemma" -- either stand by and be crushed piece-meal or risk open resistance and violent reprisals. Ultimately, only the return of the autonomy eliminated in 1989 by Milosevic and a guarantee they can choose their own future -- perhaps over a long transition period -- can provide the Albanians with credible protection against such a scenario.

As happened in Bosnia against Muslims and Croats, the expectation in Belgrade is that state-sponsored reprisals can be used to break the Albanians' will and encourage their departure, while the international community dithers and waves a disapproving finger. Belgrade's recent use of indiscriminate armed force may be a test to see how effectively it can eliminate Albanian opposition and how the international community will react. However, the violence, far from bringing calm, is only likely to trigger more unrest and to lead to a familiar cycle of death and destruction.

At some time in the future, Mr. Milosevic may then step forward and offer a "compromise" solution, as in Bosnia, with an offer to partition Kosovo, an option his political allies have floated publicly within Serbia. He may even hope that the international community would then again hail him as a reasonable peacemaker and a force for stability. However, in any partition Mr. Milosevic would be sure to take the best parts of Kosovo, including its rich mineral deposits and hydroelectric power -- perhaps using control over the Serb historical sites as a pretext (the "mines and monuments" plan) -- and squeeze the remaining majority Albanians into the inhospitable mountains or abroad. No such plan could work without large-scale ethnic cleansing or without possibly destabilizing the entire region. Others, including NATO partners Greece and Turkey, could be dragged into the conflict when waves of Albanian refugees are pushed into the fragile neighboring countries.

To avoid another Bosnia while there is still time, Belgrade must be convinced that the continued use of force and its refusal to grant Kosovo autonomy will be met by a resolute response by the international community and that the only option for Mr. Milosevic is to sit down and negotiate a new deal with the Albanians. The international community, led by the U.S. and NATO, needs to play an active role in that effort and should craft a long-range plan that includes provisions to:

-- Urge the Serb and Albanian leaderships to engage in negotiations without preconditions and to provide effective mediation services to facilitate the process.

-- Intensify diplomatic efforts to engage Kosovo's neighbors in an effort to find a regional solution.

-- Impose effective economic sanctions unless the Yugoslav president takes substantive steps to resolve the crisis peacefully.

-- Hold Mr. Milosevic legally responsible through the Yugoslav War Crimes Tribunal for all war crimes committed by forces under his command and authority.

-- Create and enforce a no-fly zone over Kosovo and be ready and willing to use appropriate force, including air strikes against Serb military targets, if necessary.

-- Make available international assistance, including security assistance, to the Albanians of Kosovo and to neighboring front-line states.

If there is one lesson the international community ought to have learned in Bosnia it is the need to act quickly and resolutely to stop such violence early. Simply agonizing and hoping that the violence will taper off will repeat all the mistakes of Bosnia. Ultimately, this is not only of dubious morality but bad realpolitik, with potentially disastrous repercussions for regional stability and the international community's credibility.

Mr. Cigar is a research fellow at the Balkan Institute and Mr. Williams is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and professor of International Relations at the American University.