

Print Request: LEXSEE

Time of Request: September 20, 2003 04:00 PM EDT

Number of Lines: 233

Job Number: 1862:0:14403395

Client ID/Project Name:

Research Information:

Lexsee 32 New ENG. L Rev. 695

Send to: KABANO, MICHEL  
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY  
11075 EAST BLVD  
CLEVELAND, OHIO 44106-5409

LEXSEE 32 New ENG. L Rev. 695

Copyright (c) 1998 New England School of Law  
New England Law Review

Spring, 1998

32 New Eng.L. Rev. 695

LENGTH: 4865 words

ARTICLE: China's Perception of the Taiwan Issue

Che-Fu Lee \*

\* Professor and Chair, Department of Sociology, The Catholic University of America, Washington, DC 20064.

## SUMMARY:

... Over the forty years since 1949, when the Nationalist Party, or *Kuomintang* (KMT), government of the Republic of China (ROC), fled the mainland to Taipei and reestablished its government seat, authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have disagreed on almost everything — except that "there is but one China." ... Under the principle of "one China," the mainland regime has adjusted its strategy — first from forceful to peaceful liberation of Taiwan during the Mao-Chou era, and then to peaceful reunification, or one country/two systems without replacing Taiwan's existing system during the Deng-Jiang era. ... Under the rule of martial law in Taiwan, the KMT government of ROC had outlawed any political movements for Taiwan's independence and insisted on its claim of sovereignty of all of China for its legitimacy. ... Taiwan's flirtation with a new claim of sovereignty over the region of Taiwan Penghu Islands, including Jinmen and Mazu, as separate from the sovereignty of the mainland, began to take shape as early as 1991 in the name of "Republic of China on Taiwan" (ROCOT). ... The sovereignty of China includes the mainland, Hong Kong, Macao, and the Taiwan region. ... In Beijing's view, until the Taiwanese authorities respond to the call for negotiations and agreements reached on ending the state of hostility as in this point of Jiang's proposal, Beijing's disavowal of the use of force is tantamount to denouncing its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. ...

The sovereignty of China, which includes the region of Taiwan, the Penghu islands, Jinmen and Mazu, belongs to all of the more than 1.2 billion Chinese people, including Taiwan compatriots, rather than to a certain group of people in Taiwan, who shall never be allowed to alter the status of Chinese sovereignty.

—Li Peng, January 30, 1996

## TEXT-1:

## [\*695] HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Over the forty years since 1949, when the Nationalist Party, or *Kuomintang* (KMT), government of the Republic of China (ROC), fled the mainland to Taipei and reestablished its government seat, authorities on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have disagreed on almost everything — except that "there is but one China." Both claimed to be the legitimate holder of China's sovereignty, awaiting the ultimate resolution by whatever means, of China's unfinished civil war. The United States officially acknowledged in the joint U.S.–China Shanghai Communique in 1972, "that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China." n1 To that effect, this American acknowledgement was repeated as a part of the normalization of the Sino–United States diplomatic relationship in 1979. Why then, at the first anniversary of Jiang Zemin's eight point policy proposal for China's reunification, which was months subsequent to Lee Tenghui's "private visit" to the United States with Beijing flexing its military muscle in response, and near the eve of the unprecedented direct election of a "president" in Taiwan, did the Chinese Premier, Li Peng, have to reiterate the same bottom-line position of Beijing government regarding the Chinese sovereignty?

[\*696] Regardless of strategic shifts in approaching the goal of China's reunification over the past half century, the

principle of Chinese sovereignty guiding China's policies toward Taiwan has remained unchanged and is unlikely to be altered or open to negotiation in the future. Under the principle of "one China," the mainland regime has adjusted its strategy — first from forceful to peaceful liberation of Taiwan during the Mao-Chou era, and then to peaceful reunification, or one country/two systems without replacing Taiwan's existing system during the Deng-Jiang era. The latest policy directive of peaceful reunification began with a proclamation by the late Marshal, Yeh Jiaanyin, who was then chairing the Standing Committee of the People's Congress in 1979. He restated the Shanghai Communiqué in saying that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China, and Taiwan is a part of China." n2 The concept of "one country, two systems" subsequently proposed by the late Deng Xiaoping was meant to supplement the goal of peaceful reunification, in which neither Taiwan nor the mainland would have to undergo drastic changes of their present social, economic, and political systems. In other words, to put China's reunification in a long-term perspective, neither side of the Taiwan Strait should interfere in the other's affairs. Through peaceful interactions and exchanges across the Strait, mutual understandings and cooperations for mutual benefits can be fostered; whatever differences in the present level of economic development, social and political lives, as consequences of the past decades of hostility and mutual seclusion of the two sides caused by the Cold War environment, will be resolved with the passage of time. In effect, the one country/two systems model of reunification repudiates the very idea of either the need or desirability of "liberation," as Chairman Mao understood the term.

Indeed, Deng's policy initiative, in retrospect, contributed to not only a thawing between people across the Strait but also a warming of the relationship between the two sides' authorities. Beijing's peaceful overtures were met by Taipei's formation of a special task force directly under the Taiwanese president to work out its own policy guidelines for China's reunification. n3 Prior to that, for example, Chiang Chingkuo, just before his death in early 1988, lifted the ban on visiting the mainland by the people of Taiwan. Soon, the volume of Taiwanese tourists and businessmen on the mainland grew to the point that mutual agreements on rules and regulations between authorities of the two sides [\*697] became necessary. Taipei then established the Foundation for Exchange Across the Strait as a government arm to deal with quasi-governmental non-political affairs. In response, Beijing also authorized the Association for the Relations Across the Strait as a counterpart to deal with cross-Strait business issues. A series of meetings between the two parties, representing Taiwan and the mainland respectively, culminated in the 1993 "summit" in Singapore between the two presidents, Wang Daohan and Ku Zenfu. Each represented the highest semi-governmental office in Beijing and Taipei for cross-Strait negotiation.

On the one hand, policy makers in Beijing might have felt complacent in seeing that the policy initiative of peaceful reunification had set on course significant contacts and negotiations between the two sides. On the other hand, they failed to grasp, or at least were reluctant to accept, the internal political dynamics that resulted in a "sea change" of power in Taiwan between the late 1980s and the early years of the 1990s.

Taiwan was encouraged by the PRC government's disastrous handling of the student demonstration in Beijing's Tiananmen Square in June 1989. The Western nations, especially the United States, subsequently imposed sanctions upon China. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Eastern block, the end of Cold War, and the rise of the United States as the only superpower all persuaded the KMT authorities to steer a new course in its relationship with the mainland. The new course of action, led by Lee Tenghui since the early 1990s, has been a campaign of "flexible," or "pragmatic," diplomacy to expand Taiwan's "international breathing (living) space." n4 This new policy shocked Beijing out of its optimistic hope that peaceful reunification could be achieved by merely relying on age-old Chinese nationalism, which was long embraced by the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Straits.

Under the rule of martial law in Taiwan, the KMT government of ROC had outlawed any political movements for Taiwan's independence and insisted on its claim of sovereignty of all of China for its legitimacy. This has changed since the lifting of martial law in 1988. Immediately, the opposition party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), was allowed to legally form. Moreover, the exiled Taiwan independence movement was allowed to return to the island, of which many members found DPP their natural political vehicle to enter elected office. [\*698] Advocacy of Taiwanese independence emerged from underground as the explicit platform of the DPP in political campaigns. In fact, Taiwanese independence, which appealed to the native Taiwanese anti-China sentiments, became the key issue for DPP to attract voters who were traditionally the ruling KMT party's detractors. As Taiwan entered an era of party politics, the ROC government, which had used its claim as the sole legitimate government of all of China as its *raison d'être*, found itself without a clear mandate. In fact, local and island-wide electoral campaigns in Taiwan were so numerous, that with hardly a year passing without one, the KMT's legitimacy was constantly put to the test. In order for the KMT party to remain in power, a difficult balancing act between pressures from both political factions on the island and from across the Strait was required.

During Lee Tenghui's succession of Chiang Chingkuo as president, and through the early 1990s, Taiwan watchers in Beijing had given Lee the benefit of the doubt. To that extent, in December 1991 when Taiwan was holding elections for the National Assembly, which turned out to be the first major shift in the power base of Taiwan, the opposition parties moved to legitimize the ROC's sovereignty over Taiwan, excluding the mainland. In response, Beijing's disaffection with independence "conspirators" was aimed primarily at the opposition DPP, not at the ruling KMT. Later, in a 1994 conference on "Relations Across the Strait" — an annual event that began in 1992 that invited scholars from both sides of the Strait and overseas Chinese scholars to exchange their views — many mainland participants appeared to be in disbelief upon hearing a paper presenting the necessity of revisiting the 1979 call for peaceful reunification by the People's Congress. The presenter of the paper argued that the assumption that Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait continue to uphold the principle of "one China" was no longer valid. This was the very basis of the 1979 policy formulation. He went on to state that the People's Congress, the highest legislative authority, must review that policy and revise it as necessary.

To put into perspective the reluctance of Beijing's policy makers in perceiving that Taiwan can be led by the ruling KMT authorities toward the goal of separation or independence, one should recall that Tang Shubei, the Executive Vice President of the China's Association for the Relations Across the Strait, was meeting in Taipei with his Taiwanese counterpart on the eve of Lee Tenghui's "private visit" to the United States in 1995. Prior to Tang aborting that meeting, he was quoted as saying, "the exchanges across the Strait on non-political businesses [\*699] shall not be interfered with by conflicting politics." n5 As a matter of fact, until the minute the White House announced the green light on Lee Tenghui's entry into the U.S., many on the mainland in charge of Taiwan's affairs, like Tang Shubei, had hoped that the hard-earned warming of the relationship across the Strait at that time would not be disrupted.

Taiwan's flirtation with a new claim of sovereignty over the region of Taiwan Penghu Islands, including Jinmen and Mazu, as separate from the sovereignty of the mainland, began to take shape as early as 1991 in the name of "Republic of China on Taiwan" (ROCOT). The new mood did not register as serious to Beijing's agencies in charge of Taiwanese affairs until Lee Tenghui made explicit references to ROCOT in his speech to an American audience at Cornell University. This opportunity given by the United States for Lee Tenghui to use the American forum to announce his deviation from a "one China" policy — that ROCOT is a separate and independent sovereignty deserving recognition by the international community — became a watershed. Only then did China lose all trust in Lee Tenghui as a counterpart for negotiating a peaceful resolution to the Taiwan issue. China felt that it had no choice but to protest to the U.S. and to the Taiwanese authorities its determination to defend China's sovereign and territorial integrity by staging war games and missile tests from the mainland side of the Taiwan Strait.

China has since suspended both all ongoing and planned quasi-governmental dialogues across the Strait and has stressed repeatedly the principle of one China as a single sovereignty. This has been the precondition for resuming cross-Strait exchanges of any governmental nature.

With this brief background of recent events, it is easier to comprehend China's current perception of the Taiwan issue as reflected in Jiang Zemin's eight point proposal for the China's unification. This proposal was proclaimed in January of 1995, six months before Lee Tenghui made his defiant response on the Cornell campus. While the timing of Lee's visit indicates a negative reply of Taiwanese authorities to Jiang's proposal, it is still noteworthy that Beijing has not retracted its proposal for peaceful reunification subsequent to its violent reactions in 1995–96. Indeed, the same eight points regarding the cross-Strait relations were reiterated in Jiang's report to the Fifteenth Party Congress just a month before his state visit to the United States in October [\*700] 1997. In other words, China does not perceive the peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue as a lost cause. Rather, it offers the Taiwanese authorities again, albeit more cautiously, an invitation to join in a dialogue to reach agreements on an official ending of hostility between two sides of the Strait, as the first step toward further development of an improved relationship.

In the rest of this Article, I will fill in specific background and considerations behind each of Jiang Zemin's eight point proposals. This is an attempt to bring into focus the Chinese perception of the Taiwan issue as it currently stands.

#### I. ADHERENCE TO THE PRINCIPLE OF "ONE CHINA" IS THE BASIS AND PREMISE FOR PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION

There are at least four inter-related conceptual dimensions underlying the principle of "one China":

- a) The sovereignty concept. An undivided sovereignty belongs to the more than 1.2 billion Chinese people, including those residing in the Taiwan region. It is not acceptable to split the sovereignty of China into "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan";

b) The territory concept. The sovereignty of China includes the mainland, Hong Kong, Macao, and the Taiwan region. That Taiwan has been under the administration of ROC is the consequence of China's civil war, unresolved because of the Cold War environment, in the sense that the ROC's rule over Taiwan has not changed Taiwan's status as a part of China. Taiwanese independence is a challenge to the integrity of China's territory and therefore, it must be opposed by all Chinese;

c) The concept of international space. Only one Chinese government can legitimately represent the sovereignty of China in the international arena. Special regions of China can be governed internally by an administration highly autonomous from China's central government, but not to the extent that dual representation of China's sovereignty is allowed;

d) The concept of national security. Any threat to the integrity of China's sovereignty and territory is an issue of China's national interest and security. Deployment of force against Taiwanese independence and the schemes of foreign elements to obstruct China's reunification is thus a part of China's national defense.

These four conceptual dimensions underlying the principle of "one China" touch upon various other policy points spelled out in the following.

Beijing has paid much attention to the theme of Lee Tenghui's speech at Cornell. Lee justified his claim for ROCOT by wide support from the 21 million Taiwanese populace, mostly reticent at the thought of immediate union with the mainland. Indeed, as a part of peddling [\*701] Taiwan's democracy to the West, the Taiwanese Commission on the Mainland Affairs has since conducted opinion polls on what Taiwan's future should be. The point that this Commission wants to make is that the majority of Taiwanese want neither to risk a war by declaring independence nor to cater to Beijing's desire for China's reunification. Rather, they desire a continuation of the status quo. Beijing can understand this public mood in Taiwan but, however, believes that this situation can be changed with time and continued progress in cross-Straits interactions. The bottom line, though, according to the sovereignty concept — individual sovereignty belongs to all Chinese people — is that Beijing is confident that upholding the principle of "one China" can eventually be supported overwhelmingly by all Chinese, including Taiwan's patriots.

Moreover, China wants a peaceful and stable international environment for its continuing economic reconstruction, and it heeds to the American interest in the stability and security of the Asia-Pacific region. China has been adamantly opposed to the U.S. sale of weapons to Taiwan, feeling that this can only escalate the tension of the Strait situation. China can be expected to repeatedly remind the United States to adhere to the three Sino-U.S. joint communiques, which are consistent with the principle of "one China."

## II. WE OPPOSE TAIWAN'S ACTIVITIES IN "EXPANDING" ITS "INTERNATIONAL LIVING SPACE," WHICH AIM TO CREATE "TWO CHINAS" OR "ONE CHINA, ONE TAIWAN"

Beijing does not challenge development of non-governmental economic and cultural ties by Taiwan with other countries, but opposes Taiwan's attempts to join international organizations that admit sovereign nations as members, such as the United Nations. Taiwanese authorities, led by Lee Tenghui, have in recent years become increasingly explicit in pushing its "flexible" or "pragmatic" diplomacy — terms used to signal its campaign for international recognition of ROCOT as a separate sovereignty independent of China. Understandably, the present ambiguous international status of Taiwan makes Taiwanese citizenry uncomfortable. To rectify the situation, Beijing proposes: "only after peaceful reunification is accomplished can Taiwan compatriots truly and fully share the international dignity and honor attained by our great motherland with other Chinese." n6

## [\*702] III. AS THE FIRST STEP, NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD BE HELD AND AN AGREEMENT REACHED ON OFFICIALLY ENDING THE STATE OF HOSTILITY BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES

In the Sino-U.S. joint communique signed on August 7, 1982 it was agreed that the U.S. sales of arms to Taiwan would not escalate beyond the existing level and would gradually be reduced to none. It is generally accepted that this agreement has not been fully implemented by the U.S. Taiwan continued to procure more and advanced weapons from the U.S. and other countries, especially immediately following Tiananmen in 1989. This can only help destabilize the Strait situation. Beijing proposes to end this arms race by officially ending the state of hostility between the two sides and ending the question over one China, two systems.

Moreover, the policy framework of "one country, two systems" as applied to Taiwan will include an allowance for Taiwan to maintain its own armed forces after unification. Beijing insists that it will send neither troops nor official personnel to replace any existing Taiwanese government functionaries. Thus, on the basis of one China, "the two sides should undertake jointly to safeguard China's sovereignty and territorial integrity and map out plans for the future development of their relations." n7 This directly contradicts the Taiwanese view that China's advocacy of reunification is

meant to "swallow up" Taiwan. To emphasize that the invitation to talk harbored no preconception of the future relations, Jiang Zemin repeated his words in his report to the Fourteenth Party Congress in 1992: "on the premise that there is only one China, we are prepared to talk with the Taiwan authorities about any matter, including the form that would be acceptable to both sides." n8 Some criticized that the invitation was too open-ended to be sincere, and was why Taiwan failed to respond to the call for a political discussion. Beijing's stated openness, nonetheless, was intentional considering Taiwanese sensitivity to the inequity of its standing. It was made clear, then, "as for the name, place and form of such political talks, a solution acceptable to both sides can certainly be found so long as consultations on an equal footing can be held at an early date." n9

[\*703] IV. WE SHOULD STRIVE FOR A PEACEFUL REUNIFICATION OF THE MOTHER-LAND SINCE CHINESE SHOULD NOT FIGHT CHINESE

Over a number of years, Taipei has officially, or through intermediaries in meeting with Beijing's officials, called for Beijing to disavow the use of force across the Strait. One reason often given was that the belligerent threat of force against Taiwan was an insult to the Taiwanese people, which would result in increasing resistance to reunification. Beijing responded, in this regard, that, "our not undertaking to give up the use of force is not directed against our compatriots in Taiwan, but against the schemes of foreign forces to interfere with China's reunification and to bring about the 'independence of Taiwan.'" n10

In Beijing's view, until the Taiwanese authorities respond to the call for negotiations and agreements reached on ending the state of hostility as in this point of Jiang's proposal, Beijing's disavowal of the use of force is tantamount to denouncing its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.

V. WE MAINTAIN THAT POLITICAL DIFFERENCES SHOULD NEITHER AFFECT NOR INTERFERE WITH ECONOMIC COOPERATION BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES

Beijing is effectively promising that, not only will the legitimate rights and interests of Taiwanese industries and businesses on the mainland be guaranteed, regardless of whatever political odds between Beijing and Taipei remain, but economic and cultural exchanges across the Strait should continue to expand. In view of long years of mutual seclusion and ideological strife between the two sides, misunderstanding and even distrust of people on either side requires time to heal through increasing experiences of interaction and cooperation for mutual benefits.

Since direct links for postal, air and shipping services and trade between the two sides are an objective requirement for their economic development and contacts in various fields, and since such links serve the interests of people on both sides, it is absolutely necessary to adopt practical measures to speed up the establishment of such direct links. n11

This specific, non-political, and practical proposal is still awaiting a positive response from the Taiwan authorities.

[\*704] VI. PEOPLE ON BOTH SIDES OF THE TAIWAN STRAIT SHOULD JOINTLY INHERIT AND CARRY FORWARD THE FINE TRADITIONS OF CHINESE CULTURE

Cultural iconoclasm, or attempts to uproot the Chinese traditional culture, did not begin with Chinese communism. Almost all of the progressive intellectuals since the later years of the Qing Dynasty have followed the renaissance idea that to change China from backwardness to modernization begins with a dissociation of the defunct traditional Chinese culture. People on the mainland, as if in a new awakening, acknowledge the damage done by the overzealousness used to destroy all symbols of the Chinese cultural heritage during the Cultural Revolution. They have, since the reform and open-door policy, devoted numerous conferences involving participants from Taiwan and overseas to the restoration of Chinese traditional culture, just short of an official recognition that the Taiwan authorities may have done a better job than the Communist administration has on the mainland for past generations.

This reflection on the Chinese tradition may have been inspired by Deng Xiaoping's call for building "a Socialist market economy with the Chinese character." It is also with new-found deference of tradition that Beijing is retracing its lineage of the Communist Revolution in China back to Sun Yatsen's revolution to establish the first Nationalist Republic, which the KMT party continues to be a posterity. "The splendid culture of five thousand years [including the recent half a century] created by the sons and daughters of all ethnic groups of China has become ties that keep the entire Chinese people close at heart. It constitutes an important basis for a peaceful reunification of the motherland," said Jiang's proposal. n12 In effect, Jiang, following Deng's reversal of the Maoist idea of "liberation," saw it counterproductive in "smashing the olds" at the height of the Cultural Revolution.

VII. WE ALSO HOPE ALL POLITICAL PARTIES IN TAIWAN WILL ADOPT A SENSIBLE, FORWARD-

## LOOKING, AND CONSTRUCTIVE ATTITUDE AND PROMOTE THE EXPANSION OF RELATIONS BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES

Beijing recognizes that the power residing in Taiwanese authorities is necessary to form negotiations and agreements between the two sides. On the other hand, the political and other vested interests among Taiwanese authorities stand to lose if the talks between the two sides necessarily [\*705] compromises their existing status as a central government in Taiwan. When Beijing expressed its preparedness "to talk with the Taiwan authorities about any matter," in the earlier point III proposal, it was meant to include "all matters of concern to the Taiwan authorities." n13 Apparently, in the view of many, the central leadership in Taiwan has not come to judge that the time is ripe to accept a "give-and-take" of negotiating chips which link directly to their vested interests.

However, Taiwan has become a pluralistic society — politically, economically and otherwise. According to Beijing, rival interest parties exist that may "adopt a sensible, forward looking and constructive attitude and promote the expansion of relations between the two sides." n14 It is noteworthy, particularly in trade and investment business, that critical opinions have been aired increasingly toward the conservatism of the Taiwanese authorities' current policies toward the mainland. It may be added, that Taiwan watchers on the mainland have, since the early 1980s, increased tremendously in number and in sophistication. Taiwan studies have become a fashionable subject in various research institutes, universities, and official and semi-official organizations. Other liaison offices, for example, the All China Taiwanese Association, charged with contacts and mediations with Taiwanese visitors to the mainland, have mushroomed to generate a network of the mainland-Taiwan "*guanxi*" (relations), which is broad in the spectrum of Taiwanese interests and diverse in its reach.

### VIII. THE AFFAIRS OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE SHOULD BE HANDLED BY CHINESE THEMSELVES, BECAUSE THEY ARE SOMETHING THAT DO NOT TAKE AN INTERNATIONAL OCCASION TO ACCOMPLISH

This view is consistent with the American position, as expressed in the Shanghai Communique and in the Taiwan's Relation Act — namely, that the Taiwan issue be resolved by the Chinese people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. Beijing has extended an invitation for direct visits to the mainland by leaders of the Taiwanese authorities and has expressed readiness to accept a reciprocal invitation to Taiwan. In Jiang Zemin's speech: "The two sides can discuss state affairs or exchange ideas on some questions first. Even a simple visit to the other side will be useful." n15 In Beijing's view, mere visits without an official meeting agenda attended by leaders of either side will help break the ice for the [\*706] development of mutual relationships in the future. Taiwan, on the other hand, has responded with great hesitance and has preferred to meet "unplanned" or "incidentally" with the mainland's leaders in a third-party place.

Beijing hopes that Taipei will stop its endeavors to "internationalize" the Taiwan issue, but Taipei believes that international visibility will work to its own advantage. This calculus may be changed, however, given the rapidly growing importance and status of China in the international arena.

### CONCLUDING REMARKS

Much of this paper has been occupied by elaborations, or simply restatements, of the compact policy speech, "Continue to promote the Reunification of China," made by Jiang Zemin on January 30, 1995. It serves the purpose, nonetheless, to expose a broader American audience to Beijing's perspective on the Taiwan issue. Given the unfading residue of Cold-War ideology, this very expose is, perhaps, countering the overwhelming pro-Taiwan sentiment in American academia and the public opinion at large. As this Cold War mentality lingers, Beijing's perspective, correct or not, tends to be discarded as the simplistic propaganda of the Cold War system. In fact, Beijing believes that it has moved beyond such foreign propaganda; and if the Taiwan issue is to be resolved, the West must recognize that Beijing perceives the policy initiatives toward Taiwan that it has put forward in the past few years as both relevant and credible in a post Cold War system. Otherwise, China's perceptions and perspectives on the issue will continue to be second guessed or dismissed outright to the detriment of mutual understanding and world peace.

Listening to others' points of view, without necessarily agreeing to them, is to afford a balanced analysis on the basis of which one assesses relative effectiveness of strategies. If this paper helps bring us all closer to an understanding of China's perception of the Taiwan issue, it also helps the interested parties concerned with the issue to come closer to the Chinese proverb, *ze ji ze bi, bai jan bai seng* — knowing accurately your opponent as well as yourself, you shall prevail all confrontations, at a war or at a negotiation table.

### FOOTNOTES:

n1 SINO-US RELATIONS: COOPERATION OR CONFLICT (1996).

n2 PEOPLE'S DAILY, Jan. 1, 1979.

n3 *See Kuotonghui*, The Committee on China's Reunification.

n4 MAINLAND AFFAIRS COUNCIL, THE EXECUTIVE YUAN, CROSS-STRAIT RELATIONS: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE (1997) (on file with the *New England Law Review*).

n5 CHINA PRESS (Qiaobao), Mar. 25, 1995.

n6 *Jiang Zemin and Li Peng on Taiwan Relation* (Beijing: China Interncontinental Press 1966).

n7 *Id.*

n8 *Id.*

n9 *Id.*

n10 *Id.*

n11 *Id.*

n12 *Jiang Zemin and Li Peng on Taiwan Relation* (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press 1966).

n13 *Id.*

n14 *Id.*

n15 *Id.*

\*\*\*\*\* Print Completed \*\*\*\*\*

Time of Request: September 20, 2003 04:00 PM EDT

Print Number: 1862:0:14403395

Number of Lines: 233

Number of Pages: 7

Send To: KABANO, MICHEL  
CASE WESTERN RESERVE UNIVERSITY  
11075 EAST BLVD  
CLEVELAND, OHIO 44106-5409