A Grand Bargain for the Middle East

By Raj Purohit and Amjad Atallah, for the Christian Science Monitor, December 11, 2006

WASHINGTON For all their hype, the 79 recommendations made by the Iraq Study Group (ISG) last week amount to a middle-of-the-road stance instead of a bold new direction. The panel paid lip service to the idea of broader diplomacy, even calling for a regional conference. But its thinking is still too narrow and US-centric.

US foreign policy in the Middle East can - and must - do better. It can begin by looking at a bigger map. The violence in Iraq is situated within - and partly connected to - broader tensions endemic to the massive crescent that stretches from Turkey in the northwest, to Sudan and Somalia in the southwest, and to India in the east.

This arc poses major risks to international peace and stability. Yet America 's piece-by-piece strategy that sees each crisis in isolation has failed to bring stability or clarity to this regional puzzle. The inability of US policy to recognize the interrelatedness of issues affecting the region has actually fanned the flames of violence there, creating a world profoundly less secure than the one that existed even 10 years ago.

To its credit, the ISG acknowledged that it is impossible to look at Iraq without looking at the broader region. But it did not grapple sufficiently with the question of "why" other regional actors should get involved with helping Iraq . Nor did it tackle squarely the failures of current US regional policy.

On Iraq , for instance, the debate has been about whether the US stays or leaves; on Lebanon , the focus is on disarming Hizbullah; on Iran , it is nuclear technology; in Somalia , it is whether US-backed warlords can get the upper hand over Islamist militias. Confronting these problems individually, as if they could be compartmentalized, won't produce the desired outcome - and it will create new challenges elsewhere. The Iraq war is a prime example.

These conflicts are connected, not just geographically, but also economically, politically, and demographically. That's why a holistic approach is so urgently needed. Specifically, it's time for the US to craft a "grand bargain" for this region. Such a bargain would comprise a comprehensive agreement or set of agreements with all nations in this arc. It will require an unprecedented multilateral approach. And the US will need to work more closely with key partners outside and inside the region.

Dealmaking on this scale requires tremendous political will, something that can come only from understanding that a grand bargain isn't an abstract exercise in diplomacy, but a practical recognition of how violence is linked across the arc.

Most observers around the world, for example (except in Washington ) are convinced that the failure to provide for a Palestinian state alongside a safe and secure Israel has fueled anti-American sentiment across the region. Less well known is how instability in Pakistan , partly as a result of the dispute with India over Kashmir, has fueled a hard-line version of Sunni Islam that has destabilized Pakistan and Afghanistan , and provided a safe haven for Al Qaeda. The connections are sometimes gross and sometimes subtle. But they must be dealt with to move US policy beyond simplistic "war on terror" thinking that obscures regional realities in a "with us or with them" dichotomy.

The arc is stressed by shared conflicts, but it is also stitched together by common threads that tend toward peace. A grand bargain could build on many shared interests, collectively addressing the demographic, economic, and security challenges within the region itself and with its external neighbors. This would promote a unique partnership modeled more on the US-European relationship than on past colonial methodologies.

By way of illustration, the Afghanistan component of a grand bargain would require at least three steps: 1) The US must allay Iranian fears of a military sortie by US forces in Afghanistan; 2) Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf must rein in the Pakistani intelligence corps and those Taliban in Pakistan who have been undermining security in Afghanistan; and 3) the US must urge India to be more open to multilateral dialogue on Kashmir, partly to bolster Mr. Musharraf.

America 's diplomatic structure must be beefed up to secure this sweeping set of interrelated agreements. It's an investment that would pay substantial dividends. All the countries in the arc - not to mention the US - would benefit from a change in the status quo and would therefore be willing to compromise to gain real security. A radical course correction led by the US could secure lasting, peaceful change throughout the Near East and Africa .

• Raj Purohit is a senior fellow at Citizens for Global Solutions. Amjad Atallah is the founder and president of Strategic Assessments.

The Clinton administration's characterization of the recent elections in Bosnia as "extraordinarily important and positive" crosses the line between "spin" and fantasy. Even more incredible is U.S. Envoy Robert Gelbard's claim that the vote will promote the "further development of democratic pluralism."

In fact, these elections represent the biggest setback to Bosnian reunification since the Dayton Accords rewarded Serbian aggression and legitimized the politics of ethnic supremacism three years ago.

Voters in Bosnia's Serbian entity have elected as their president Nikola Poplasen, a man who is known as the "Duke of the Chetniks [Serbian nationalists]." He was a uniformed soldier during Serbia's 1992-95 war against Bosnian civilians, and his party is affiliated with the Belgrade- based party of unindicted Serbian war criminal and paramilitary leader Vojislav Seselj. Mr. Poplasen has stated that "entity borders are only imaginary lines" and that he will use "all constitutional means" to unite the Bosnian Serb entity with Serbia proper. He has also said that "Serbian political and historical goals" - that is, the creation of a unitary, ethnically "pure" state for all Serbs - "do not have to be achieved during my mandate, but in some five to ten years."

Throughout the tenure of Biljana Plavsic, the less extremist nationalist whom Mr. Poplasen defeated, Mr. Gelbard and other U.S. officials pointed to the significance of her role and office as evidence of the success of the administration's Bosnia policies. Mrs. Plasvic and her allies were rewarded with millions of dollars in U.S. assistance. During the electoral campaign, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright even gave her a de facto endorsement through a public meeting. Now, however, Mr. Gelbard says that the presidency of the Serbian entity is insignificant. Even more remarkably, he is also claiming that this was the only race that did not produce the results for which the United States had hoped.

This is, of course, nonsense. In the Serbian entity's parliamentary races, the Clinton administration did not want Mr. Poplasen's party and its coalition partner, the party of indicted war criminal Radovan Karadzic, to win nearly three times as many votes as Mrs. Plavsic's party. Nor did it want incumbent Bosnian Croat nationalist leader Kresimir Zubak to be defeated by ultranationalist Ante Jelavic, who told voters that he would protect their national interests "at any cost" and preserve the Bosnian Croat entity's strong links with Croatia proper.

Mr. Gelbard and a chorus of international officials are also claiming that, in spite of these results, the elections in general reflect the "continued erosion" of support for nationalists. This claim is specious because even the Bosnian Serb and Bosnian Croat candidates whom the United States has deemed more moderate and less nationalist have implemented policies that are little different in substance from those of Bosnia's most extremist officials.
The difference between the two groups has been largely in style. While Mr. Karadzic waxed defiant and ranted about Serbian supremacy, Mrs. Plavsic pledged cooperation with the West. While Momcilo Krajisnik vowed to discard the Dayton Accords, Zivko Radisic, the more soft-spoken former Banja Luka mayor who defeated him in the race for the Serbian seat in Bosnia's presidency, vowed to accept the accords and focus on economic reforms. While Mr. Jelavic boasted about his close relations with Zagreb, Mr. Zubak repeatedly made noises about minority rights and cooperation.

In practice, all six leaders - and many of their Muslim counterparts - have implemented execrable policies that fly in the face of the Dayton Accords. In 1997, these officials - including Mr. Karadzic, who continues to exercise influence behind the scenes - allowed only 50,000 internally displaced persons to return to their homes. Of these, only 10,000 were able to return to areas in which their ethno-religious group is now in the minority. Only 25 percent of the country's refugees were allowed to return from abroad. As a result, more than one million people - or one in every four Bosnians - are still displaced.

Throughout their tenures, these officials have also allowed police to violate human rights with impunity and have implemented racist policies that have been, at best, highly discriminatory against - and, at worst, physically injurious to - minorities in their jurisdictions.

In short, Bosnia's hardline nationalists are maintaining their arch rhetoric while cementing Bosnia's post-war ethnic divisions. The U.S.-preferred nationalists are playing the Dayton game by speaking softly, attending meetings with their counterparts of other ethnicities, and accepting U.S. praise and aid checks. All the while, however, they, too, are promoting Bosnia's partition.

It is impossible to conceive of a reunified, multiethnic Bosnian state as long as the Clinton administration provides cover for nationalism with a human face. After three years of such U.S. support, Bosnia is today more ethnically segregated than when the war ended. To reverse this process, Mr. Gelbard and other officials must, first, stop spinning the truth about what is happening in the country. Second, they must stop pinning their hopes on nationalists who merely pay lip service to cooperation. Last, they must finally develop policies to assist the country's genuinely democratic and pro-reunification forces.

Marshall Freeman Harris, senior fellow at Freedom House, is a former State Department official who resigned in protest against U.S. inaction in Bosnia.